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The budgeting process plays an important role in organizations’ planning and controlling 
functions. Managers often have incentives to misreport their private information and inaccurately 
set budget targets so that they are easily achievable. Such inaccuracy in budget targets is referred 
to as budgetary slack. Prior research documents that managers’ decisions to create budgetary 
slack are influenced by both preferences for wealth and non-pecuniary motivations.  The 
objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of how social preferences such as 
preferences for horizontal equity, self efficacy perceptions, and ethical position influence 
managers’ budgetary slack creation. The results reveal a significant interaction between 
horizontal equity (equal and unequal compensation relative to a peer) and self efficacy (poor and 
viii 
 
 
 
good prior performance) on the intention to create budgetary slack. Further, this research 
provides evidence regarding the impact of ethical position in the relations among perceived 
fairness, self efficacy, and budgetary slack creation. 
Key words: Budgetary slack, Horizontal equity, Self efficacy, Ethical position 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The consequences of unethical behavior pose significant threats for organizations. 
Therefore, an emergent body of research examines potential motives that influence unethical 
misconduct. Consistent with agency theory, prior studies assert that self-interested preferences 
for wealth are a key reason that individuals engage in unethical behavior (Baiman, 1982; 1990; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). However, other research suggests that non-pecuniary motives also influence 
individuals’ behavior in economically significant ways (Douglas and Wier, 2000; Evans, 
Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser, 2001; Hannan, 2005; Hartmann and Maas, 2010; Matuszewski, 
2010; Merchant, 1985; Sridhar, 1994; Stevens, 2002; Young, 1985). Luft (1997) and Sprinkle 
(2003) describe the importance of understanding the effects of social preferences on individuals’ 
judgment and decision making and call for additional research in this area. The present study 
seeks to answer this call for research by examining several non-pecuniary motivational factors 
which are expected to influence managers’ judgment and decision making in participative 
budgeting settings. Specifically, this study investigates the impact of horizontal equity in peer 
compensation, perceptions of self efficacy, and ethical position on managers’ decisions to create 
budgetary slack.  
The results of this study should be of interest to stakeholders of organizations. Budgets 
serve an important role in organizational planning and control. They are used for resource 
allocation decisions, target setting, and subordinates’ performance evaluations. Thus, there are 
incentives for subordinates to engage in unethical misconduct in budgeting settings (i.e. to create 
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budgetary slack). Sprinkle (2003) defines budgetary slack as an ethical issue which is present 
when a subordinate intentionally chooses to misreport their actual information to the superior. 
The 2008-2009 KPMG Organizational Integrity Survey reports that the prevalence of unethical 
behavior within organizations is considerably high. Of the employees surveyed, 74 percent 
reported observing unethical misconduct within their organizations. In addition, 46 percent of 
employees reported that the nature of the misconduct was severe and could potentially harm the 
public trust of their organization. Two of the most commonly observed forms of misconduct 
were wasting or mismanaging organizations’ resources and mishandling private information.  
These two forms of misconduct are present in the creation of budgetary slack.  
Prior research indicates that a preference for fairness is an important non-pecuniary 
motivational factor that can impact managers’ decisions to engage in misconduct (Evans et al., 
2001; Fehr and Smith, 1999; Luft, 1997). Equity theory suggests that perceptions of the fairness 
of contributions and compensations exchanged for a specific task will influence individuals’ 
behavior in regard to that task (Adams, 1963). The term “horizontal equity” refers to a situation 
in which an individual perceives that he or she is treated equally or fairly relative to other peers 
who have the same responsibility. Prior studies indicate that perceptions of fairness related to 
horizontal equity can significantly affect individuals’ ethical behavior (Kim, Evans, and Moser, 
2005; Matuszewski, 2010; Moser, Evans, and Kim, 1995).  
A manager’s comparisons of his or her own compensation structure relative to peers’ 
compensation structures can strongly influence perceptions of horizontal equity. Companies may 
have valid reasons to create inequities in compensation structures across departments, divisions 
or employees. Unequal compensation systems among peers may be unavoidable in order to 
fulfill specific employment or projects terms. An unintended consequence of such differences 
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may be employee feelings of horizontal inequity. Hollinger (1991) suggests that unequal 
compensation systems are a significant predictor of deviant and counterproductive behaviors. 
Matuszewski (2001) finds evidence that horizontal equity in compensation and shifts in the 
levels of horizontal equity are positively related to the degree of managerial honesty in budgeting 
settings. In an extension of this research, the present study investigates the effects of preferences 
for fairness on managers’ ethical judgment and decision making by focusing on the impact of 
horizontal equity preferences. Based on equity theory and prior literature I hypothesize that 
horizontal equity influences the extent to which a manager will create budgetary slack. 
  A second non-pecuniary motivational factor of interest in this study is self efficacy. 
Bandura (1995) defines self efficacy as individuals’ belief in their ability to perform a specific 
task. Individuals will be more likely to engage in, and put effort toward, tasks that they believe 
they are capable of completing. However, when self efficacy is low, individuals may not feel that 
their effort will result in the successful performance of a task and may look for alternative ways 
to obtain their desired outcomes. Thus, self efficacy will influence the extent of individuals’ 
decisions to engage in unethical misconduct in order to achieve a desired outcome (Dunn and 
Schweitzer, 2005). Prior research uses information related to one’s prior performance as an 
effective source of self efficacy perceptions (Bandura, 1995; Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte, Saks, 
and Hook, 1997). The current study addresses a gap in the participative budgeting literature by 
examining the effect of prior performance as a source for self efficacy on budgetary slack 
creation. Based on self-efficacy theory, I argue that, in general, higher self efficacy lead to less 
budgetary slack creation. However, I also assert that self efficacy perceptions interact with 
perceptions of horizontal equity such that individuals with high self efficacy will view horizontal 
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inequity as more unfair than individuals with low self efficacy and will therefore be more likely 
to engage in budgetary slack creation.  
The final motivational factor of interest in this study is ethical position. Forsyth’s ethical 
ideology theory (1980) suggests that individuals take particular stances regarding ethics based on 
two factors, relativism and idealism. The theory suggests that individuals’ ethical position will 
affect their moral judgments and behaviors. Douglas and Wier (2000) find a positive association 
between budgetary slack and relativism whereas they find a negative association between 
idealism and budgetary slack creation. The current study extends prior research by examining 
whether ethical position modifies the influence of horizontal equity and self efficacy on 
managers’ creation of budgetary slack.  
In summary, this study addresses the following primary research questions: (1) Does 
horizontal equity influence budgetary slack decisions? (2) Does self efficacy influence budgetary 
slack decisions? (3) Does self efficacy interact with perceptions of fairness arising from 
horizontal equity in influencing budgetary slack decisions? (4) Does ethical position modify the 
influence of horizontal equity and self efficacy on an individual’s decision to create budgetary 
slack? 
A 2x2 between subjects experiment using graduate students as participants was 
conducted to test the hypotheses and answer the study’s research questions. Participants are 
provided with a hypothetical case in which they are asked to assume the role of a division 
manager who is responsible for setting budgeted production costs. As manager, they received 
private information related to their expected costs. While the company desires managers to set 
their budgets based on their best expectation of actual costs, a manager can profit from 
misrepresenting their private information. Horizontal equity of compensation structure was 
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manipulated between subjects by describing a peer’s compensation as either equal to or more 
favorable than the participant’s compensation structure. Self efficacy was manipulated between 
subjects by a description of the manager’s prior performance in setting budgets accurately (poor 
prior performance or good prior performance).  After reading the case, participants were asked to 
make their decision regarding the budget they will report to the firm. The primary dependent 
variable of interest, budgetary slack, measured as the difference between their private 
information of estimated actual costs and their reported budgeted costs. Participants also 
responded to manipulation check questions, several additional questions about their perceptions 
of various aspects of the case, an ethical position questionnaire, and demographic questions.    
This study contributes to the literature by examining how social motives, such as 
perceived fairness and self efficacy, influence the decision to create budgetary slack. The results 
of this study should be of interest to academics and stakeholders of organizations for several 
reasons. First, the results of this study provide information regarding the extent to which 
individuals are willing to sacrifice wealth due to non-pecuniary motives such as preferences for 
fairness. Second, this study examines the unintended consequences of prior performance 
feedback. The results reveal that such feedback can define perceptions of self efficacy which 
may lead to a higher propensity for unethical behavior. Third, prior research has documented an 
association between budgetary slack and ethical position (Douglas and Wier, 2000). The current 
study seeks to add to our knowledge of this association by examining ethical position as a 
moderator given the joint effects of horizontal equity and self efficacy. Further, the present study 
answers calls for research investigating the effects of social preferences on individuals’ judgment 
and decision making (Luft, 1997; Sprinkle, 2003) and research on participative budgeting 
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settings examining factors related to multiple subordinate settings (Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 
2012). 
The results from the hypotheses tests indicate no significant main effect of horizontal equity 
and self efficacy to the budgetary slack creation behavior. However, the findings affirm a 
significant interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy to the intention on creating 
budget slack. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the likelihood of deviating from the 
forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. The analyses specify 
the relation between the ethical position and the decision to create slack. Particularly, the 
budgetary slack creation has a negative association with idealism and positive association with 
relativism. Further, the findings show that gender is a significant covariate for budgetary slack 
creation decision where men are significantly more likely to create slack than women.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literature on budgetary slack, horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical position. This chapter 
elaborates the theoretical basis for the hypotheses development. Chapter 3 describes the research 
methodology and the research instrument. Chapter 4 elaborates the analyses and reports the 
results from hypotheses tests. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions, implications, 
limitations of the study, and potential topics for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
 
Budgetary Slack 
Budgets serve many important roles as organizational planning and controlling tools. 
They are used for target setting, resource allocation decisions, and as a common method for 
evaluating subordinates’ performance. In participative budget settings, a subordinate (i.e., an 
agent) is given some responsibility for setting the budget (Lindquist, 1995; Waller, 1988; Young, 
1985). According to agency theory, in such settings there is often information asymmetry 
between the principal (i.e., the superior) and the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
existence of information asymmetry gives the subordinate exposure to private information that is 
not available to the superior. Therefore, subordinates have the opportunity to misrepresent their 
private information. As budgets are used in a variety of ways, a subordinate may have incentives 
to set the budget opportunistically through the creation of budgetary slack.  
Budgetary slack is the difference between the subordinate’s actual information and what 
the subordinate chooses to reveal to the superior (Sprinkle, 2003). For example, subordinates 
may claim more resources than their private information indicates are necessary to achieve the 
desired outcome (Cyert and March, 1963). Budgetary slack could also occur if a subordinate 
intentionally provides a biased budgetary target in order to increase the likelihood of achieving 
the budget goal.  For example, a subordinate’s private information may indicate that a certain 
level of output is attainable. However, the subordinate may set the budgeted target at a lower 
output level to ensure that the target is met.  Prior research consistently documents the existence 
of slack creation in practice (Cyert and March, 1963; Dunk and Parera, 1997; Onsi, 1973; 
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Merchant, 1985; Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Van der Stede, 2000). Onsi (1973) conducted an 
interview with 32 managers and found 80 percent of the managers admitted to budgetary slack 
creation under favorable and unfavorable business conditions.  Firms recognize that the creation 
of budgetary slack is a common practice and may even serve a purpose. Merchant and Manzoni 
(1989) find evidence that firms increase managers’ discretion to build slack in order to encounter 
unexpected changes in operational cycle, encourage coordination, motivation, innovation, and 
induce creative thinking. Dunk and Parera’s (1997, p. 658) field study documents a manager who 
claims that it would be “inhuman if I did not build in some slack.” 
Slack is considered to be “a multifaceted construct that embodies both negative and 
positive connotations [for the organization]” (Sprinkle, 2003, p. 291). At times, budgetary slack 
will lead to favorable outcomes. For example, slack may permit subordinates the resources and 
flexibility to engage in research and development innovations (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989).  
Cyert and March (1963) propose that slack absorbs prospective uncertainty in the firm’s 
environment. Van der Stede (2000, p. 619) observes that firms with differentiation competitive 
strategy
1
 utilize flexible budgetary control and “by doing so, indirectly mandate more slack.” 
This is consistent with the use of budgetary slack to facilitate innovation development. In 
addition, research indicates that budgetary slack is positively associated with business unit 
growth (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2006) and firms’ prior performance (Van der Stede, 2000).  
However, budgetary slack can also be detrimental to the organization. For instance, slack can 
lead to inefficient resource allocation, ineffective budgeting functions and deceptive performance 
measurement.  Onsi (1973) argues that the existence of budgetary slack will lead to a less 
                                                          
1
 Porter (1980) defines differentiation competitive strategy as a firm strategy which focuses on innovation processes 
and emphasizes superior product features, brand image and customer service. 
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optimal firm profit due to the costs of overestimation. In addition, Stevens (2002) observes that 
budgetary slack is negatively associated with reputation and ethical concerns.  
Motivations for the Creation of Budgetary Slack 
Often, managers create slack in a manner consistent with their economic self interest. For 
example, slack may be created to improve their performance evaluations so that they can 
maintain or increase their compensation. Agency theory is often used in research to explain why 
individuals engage in self-interested opportunistic behavior (Baiman, 1982; 1990; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Traditional agency theory assumes that individuals only utilize wealth preference in their 
decision making function. When a subordinate has both access to private information and the 
opportunity to obscure it from the organization, agency theory predicts that self interest will 
motivate the subordinate to engage in slack-building to maximize wealth.  
While agency theory suggests that self interest is a primary motivation for subordinates’ 
creation of budgetary slack, prior research also documents additional factors that contribute to 
the creation of budgetary slack. Such factors include the existence of information asymmetry and 
risk preferences (Young, 1985), the extent of individuals’ involvement in the budgeting process 
(Hartmaan and Maas, 2010; Merchant, 1985; Young, 1985), the level at which budgeting 
decisions are made (Kohlmeyer and Hunton, 2004), the type of pay scheme (Waller, 1998), the 
concern for reputation and variance investigation (Webb, 2002), and the type of performance 
feedback (Young, Fisher, and Lindquist, 1993). This stream of research indicates that self 
interest, social preferences, and values interact to influence decision making behavior associated 
with budgetary practices. 
Luft (1997) and Sprinkle (2003) highlight the importance of investigating the impact of 
non-pecuniary motivations, such as social motivations, on managers’ judgment and decision 
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making in managerial accounting settings. They suggest that social motives will help to explain 
the discrepancy between theoretical predictions based on economic self interest and observed 
behavior. For example, economic self interest is not consistent with an individual willingly 
ignoring a chance to maximize wealth. A seminal participative budgeting study that 
demonstrates the existence of non pecuniary motivations is Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 
(2001).  
Evans et al. (2001) examine how managers’ preferences for honesty affect managerial 
reporting decisions. Their experiment provides participants with actual costs and requires them 
to submit a target cost for multiple periods. The participants are compensated based on the 
difference between the target and the actual cost such that they keep the surplus funds if actual 
costs are lower than targeted costs. As participants know the actual costs with certainty, their 
compensation increases with certainty if they set the target cost higher than the actual cost. 
Economic self interest predicts that participants will maximize their wealth by claiming the 
highest payoff available (i.e., by setting the target at the highest possible amount allowed every 
period). However, Evans et al. (2001) find that on average participants willingly forgo maximum 
payoffs. In fact, 25 percent of the participants chose not to misreport the cost target at all. 
Therefore, Evans et al. (2001) provide evidence that individuals often sacrifice wealth in order to 
create an honest managerial report.  
Other studies also indicate that individuals’ decisions related to budgets incorporate 
preferences other than wealth maximization, such as reciprocity (Hannan, 2005), trust and 
reputation (Sridhar, 1994; Stevens, 2002), personality characteristics (Hartmann and Maas, 
2010), and ethical ideology (Douglas and Wier, 2000). Studies such as these that investigate how 
social motives influence managerial accounting decisions can yield extensive details on when, 
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why and how social preferences impact managerial accounting conflict (Sprinkle, 2003). 
Ultimately, including social motives in research will generate alternative explanations and 
solutions to improve the design of managerial accounting practice (Luft, 1997). The present 
study extends this research by examining the relation between budgetary slack and two social 
motives: equity and self efficacy preferences. 
Equity 
Organizational justice literature identifies three forms of justice related to perceived 
equity or fairness: procedural justice, interactional justice, and distributive justice (Greenberg, 
1987; Starlicki and Folger, 1997).
2 
Procedural justice is related to the degree of fairness in the 
process used to determine an outcome. For example, when budget targets are used for 
performance evaluations subordinates’ perceptions of the fairness of a company’s budgeting 
process would influence their perceptions of procedural justice. Interactional justice refers to 
subordinates’ perceptions of how fair the interactions are between individuals involved in a 
process. For instance, subordinates’ judgment of the fairness of the way they are treated by 
superiors is a measure of interactional justice. Distributive justice is related to how individuals 
view the fairness of the distribution of an outcome. For example, employees’ perceptions of the 
fairness of their pay relative to other employees’ pay is a measure of distributive justice. This 
study is primarily interested in the impact of perceived equity of relative pay on subordinate 
behavior in budgetary slack settings. Thus, distributive justice is the most relevant form of 
perceived equity for the current study.   
                                                          
2
 In this study the terms “equity,” “fairness,” and “justice” are considered to have the same underlying definition and 
are used interchangeably. Specifically, these terms refer to the state, quality, or ideal of being just, impartial, and 
fair.  
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Equity theory 
Equity theory, also often referred to as inequity theory, was first proposed by J. S. Adams 
in 1963.  Equity theory describes the process of how an individual will react based on his 
perceptions of the equity of the contributions and rewards exchanged for a specific job or 
assignment. This theory can be broken down to three propositions (Huseman, Hatfield,  and 
Miles, 1987). First, individuals desire to maintain an equitable or balanced exchange between the 
inputs (contributions) that they provide to the job and the outcomes (rewards) that they receive 
from the job.  Inputs in this context consist of employees’ characteristics, such as age and 
ethnicity; professional qualities, such as employees’ devoted time to the job, performance, effort, 
expertise, qualifications, experience; and intangible interpersonal qualities, such as drive, loyalty, 
tolerance, determination, enthusiasm, ambition, and other interpersonal skills. Outcomes include 
monetary rewards, such as salary, bonus, perks and benefits; and non monetary rewards, such as 
recognition, reputation, responsibility, written and verbal appreciation, job security, flexible 
work arrangements and opportunity for growth.  An attribute can be considered an input or 
outcome as long as the employee perceives it to be relevant to the exchange (Adams, 1963).  
Therefore, each individual may have different attributes that constitute their perception of inputs 
and outcomes exchanged.  
The second proposition of equity theory suggests that individuals will compare their 
inputs and outcomes exchanged against a reference person or group to determine whether they 
are treated equally or not (Huseman et al., 1987).
3
   The reference person or groups range from 
colleagues, peers, and superiors, to family members and relatives. Individuals will view they are 
                                                          
3
 The comparative process between an individual and his reference is aligned with social comparison processes 
theory as described by Festinger (1954). Social comparison theory states that individuals have the drive to compare 
themselves to others to evaluate and validate their opinions and or abilities. Furthermore, Homans (1961) asserts that 
individuals will compare their state to others’ to evaluate the existence of distributive justice.  
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in an equitable state if they perceive that they receive equal outcomes as an exchange for their 
inputs relative to their reference person or groups.  Further, an inequitable state is present if 
individuals perceive that their inputs and outcomes exchanged are not equal.  
The final proposition of equity theory specifies that inequity in rewards will create a 
negative state that will motivate behavioral changes designed to negate inequity (Huseman et al., 
1987). For an over-rewarded situation, the negative state includes guilt and fear of retaliation. On 
the other hand, under-rewarded individuals will experience emotional distress.  Moreover, 
individuals who receive an unequal reward are less content and satisfied compared to those who 
receive an equal reward (Austin and Walster, 1974; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973).  In 
addition, Hollinger (1991) suggests that rewards perceived to be unequal are a significant 
predictor of deviant behaviors such as theft and other counterproductive acts.  Individuals 
committing deviant behaviors often intend to restore the state of equality.  A meta-analytic 
review by Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng (2001) provides further evidence that 
perceived inequity may result in a variety of negative reactions to restore equity.  These negative 
reactions include reducing effort, negotiating rewards, theft, and decisions to transfer to another 
division or leave the firm (Greenberg, 1990; Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Skarlicki and Folger, 
1997).  
Equity preferences and economic self-interest 
Preferences for, or perceptions of, equity or fairness of relative pay preferences may 
interact with economic self interest to affect behavior. Fehr and Smith (1999) investigate settings 
where economic self interest and preferences for equity can conflict. Their results suggest that 
the economic context or environment influences which motive will be dominant.  Equity 
preferences are found to dominate in ultimatum games, gift exchange games, and public goods 
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games with punishment settings, while economic self interest dominates in market games and 
public goods games without punishment. These results indicate that individuals are inclined to 
sacrifice material payoffs in exchange for more equitable outcomes in some settings.   
Luft (1997) calls for research investigating the influence of economic self interest and 
equity motives on behavior in managerial accounting settings. She posits that investigating 
equity preferences will increase the ability to explain management accounting practice. Cohen, 
Holder-Webb, Sharp, and Pant (2007) find evidence consistent with this assertion. They examine 
the influence of fairness on individuals’ stated intentions to engage in opportunistic action in cost 
reporting settings. Their experiment analyzes 233 managers’ stated intentions to allocate research 
and development costs to either a nearly complete project or to a future project. The choice to 
allocate these costs to a future project is an opportunistic action in the experiment. The results 
show that perceived fairness is a significant determinant of individuals’ stated intention to 
engage in the opportunistic action.
4
 In other words, if participants perceive an action to be fair or 
to lead to a fair outcome, they are more likely to engage in that action. Further, sensitivity 
analyses indicate that intentions to act opportunistically are not affected by the magnitude of the 
rewards. Rather, if individuals perceived the outcome from misallocating the cost as fair, they 
will engage in that action regardless of the magnitude of the reward.  Thus, Cohen et al. (2007) 
affirm that self interest is not the only motive dictating individuals’ behavior. Furthermore, this 
study indicates that perceived equity can alter and influence individuals’ decision-making 
processes.  
                                                          
4
 Cohen et al. (2007) measure the perceptions of outcome fairness based on participant responses to three moral 
equity items of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1990). The three 
equity scales, using seven point Likert scale, measure how fair, how just, and how morally right participants 
perceive the cost allocation action described in the case to be. 
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Equity preferences and budgetary slack 
Evans et al. (2001) conducted three experiments to observe how managers’ preferences 
for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting decisions. In addition to the results discussed 
in a previous section, they also found that reporting honesty varies based on the distribution of 
payoffs between the subordinate and the firm. Honesty is higher when managers receive a higher 
share of profits than when managers receive a lower share of profits. This result is consistent 
with equity theory as it suggests individuals perceived a certain distribution of profit to be a fair 
exchange. Thus, the reported level of honesty is influenced by individuals’ reactions to the 
perceived fairness of the payoff distribution. 
Several additional studies investigate the influence of equity preferences on budgeting 
settings (Libby, 2001; 2003; Lindquist, 1995; Little, Magner, and Welker, 2002; Staley and 
Magner, 2007; Wentzel, 2002; 2004).  Evidence from this literature suggests that when managers 
perceive budgetary procedures to be fair they demonstrate a low propensity to create budgetary 
slack, high job performance, and high organizational citizenship behavior (Little et al., 2002). 
Libby (2003) investigates the association between compensation contracts and the creation of 
budgetary slack. Her results indicate that participants who perceive their compensation 
contracting process to be fair create less budgetary slack than those who perceive their 
compensation contracting process to be unfair. In a participative budgeting setting with 
asymmetric information, Wentzel (2004) examines whether fairness or equity preferences 
moderate the creation of budgetary slack. In general, her results indicate that budgeting practices 
that are perceived to be fair result in less budgetary slack.  
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Horizontal equity and budgetary slack 
The present study extends the prior research investigating the effects of equity 
preferences on the creation of budgetary slack by focusing on the impact of horizontal equity 
preferences.  The term “horizontal equity” is used to illustrate fair treatment among colleagues or 
peers and “horizontal inequity” refers to a situation where an individual perceives that he or she 
is treated inequitably relative to other peers or colleagues with the same responsibility (Kim, 
Evans, and Moser, 2005; Matuszewski, 2010; Moser, Evans, and Kim, 1995). Thus, an 
investigation of the impact of horizontal equity on decision making means that the experimental 
participant can make comparisons between themselves and a referent peer. Most prior 
experimental research on participative budgeting focuses on situations involving a single 
superior/subordinate pair where the subordinate has no information about other peer subordinates 
(Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2012). However, subordinates faced with budgeting decisions in 
practice will often have some information regarding their peers, whether it is in the form of 
inputs (e.g., peer compensation levels, treatment of peers by superiors, peer working conditions, 
etc.) or peer outputs (e.g., peer choices, behaviors, reputation, productivity levels, etc.). Thus, 
Brink et al. (2012) call for additional research investigating participative budgeting settings with 
multiple subordinates. The current study answers that call for research.  
In addition, as the previous section illustrates, prior research investigating the impact of 
equity preferences in managerial accounting settings tends to focus on forms of equity other than 
horizontal equity, such as the fairness of the contracting process (Libby, 2003; Wentzel, 2004) or 
distribution of pay between the superior and subordinate (Evans et al., 2001). In areas other than 
budgeting, however, accounting research finds that horizontal equity concerns have a significant 
impact on behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ghosh, 2000; Kachelmeier and Towry, 2002; Kim 
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et al., 2005; Luft and Libby, 1997; Moser et al., 1995). Kim et al. (2005) and Moser et al. (1995) 
find that taxpayers’ decisions to report taxable income honestly are impacted by economic 
effects and perceptions of horizontal equity. Luft and Libby (1997) affirm that experienced 
managers’ perceptions of horizontal equity on the relative profit distribution influenced 
negotiated transfer prices.  
Only one study, Matuszewski (2010), directly investigates the impact of horizontal equity 
in a budgeting setting. She examines whether a manager’s honesty in budgetary reporting is 
influenced by changes in horizontal equity between his own and a peer’s salary. In her 
experiment, participants assume the role of department manager engaged in a multi-period 
participative budgeting task. Matuszewski’s participants submit a cost target after they receive 
private information regarding the actual costs, their compensation structure, and their peer’s 
compensation structure. Participants were able to retain the difference between the actual cost 
and the reported cost target, creating an incentive to misreport the cost target. The dependent 
variable is degree of honesty of the reported cost target. Matuszewski’s experiment manipulates 
changes in horizontal equity (no changes, increased, or decreased) and shifts in relative salary 
levels (equal, peer’s salary is higher, and peer’s salary is lower). Her results suggest that honesty 
increases when shifts in relative salary levels result in a restoration of equity or increase 
horizontal equity.  Further, the increase in honesty is greater when horizontal equity is achieved 
by increasing the manager’s salary so that it is equal to the peer’s salary as compared to 
treatments where horizontal equity is restored through a decrease in the peer’s salary. In 
summary, Matuszewski (2001) finds evidence indicating that changes in horizontal equity in the 
reward system are positively associated with changes in the degree of honesty in budgeting 
settings.  
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In summary, equity theory and prior literature suggest that individuals’ preferences for 
equity will influence their choices in budgetary settings. Specifically, when individuals 
experience horizontal equity they will demonstrate higher honesty resulting in less budgetary 
slack than when they experience horizontal inequity.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Individuals with horizontal equity in compensation will create less budgetary slack 
than those with horizontal inequity in compensation. 
 
Self Efficacy 
Albert Bandura (1995, p. 2) defined self efficacy as “the belief in one’s capabilities to 
organize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations.” Thus, self 
efficacy theory relates to an individual’s belief regarding whether he or she has the ability to 
execute or perform a specific act. Self efficacy theory suggests this belief will affect performance 
both directly and indirectly.   
Empirical studies on the effects of perceived self efficacy have been conducted in various 
research settings. For example, self efficacy influences the decision to volunteer (Lindenmeier, 
2008), escalation of commitment decisions (Whyte, Saks, and Hook, 1997), personal and 
academic goals and performance (Lee, Locke, and Phan, 1997; Wood and Locke, 1987; 
Zimmerman, Bandura, and Martinez-Pons, 1992), goal orientation (Brown, Cron, and Slocum, 
1998; Cumming and Hall, 2004), the ability to adapt to new technology (Hill, Smith, and Mann, 
1987), career choices (Lent, Brown, and Hackett, 1994).  A meta-analytic review by Stajkovic 
and Luthans (1998) concludes that self efficacy is positively and significantly related to task 
performance.  
Self efficacy differs from self esteem. Self efficacy relates to an individual’s view of his 
or her personal capability on a specific task. Whereas, self esteem describes an individual’s 
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exhaustive evaluation of his or her own self worth (Bandura, 1997). Hence, the distinction 
between self efficacy and self esteem lies in the scope of the evaluation. Self esteem is an overall 
evaluation of one’s self while self efficacy is a task specific evaluation. Bandura (1997) 
describes three self efficacy dimensions that determine the self efficacy associated with each 
task. First, efficacy depends on the level of magnitude of task difficulty that individuals believe 
they can overcome. Second, strength relates to how convinced one is in their magnitude beliefs. 
Third, efficacy differs in generality or the degree to which expectations can be extended to other 
situations (Gist, 1987). These dimensions establish a distinct perception of efficacy for each task.   
Bandura (1977) also contrasts self efficacy and outcome expectation. Outcome 
expectation is an individual’s estimation that a certain outcome will result from a given behavior. 
Self efficacy is “the conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to 
produce [that] outcome” (Bandura, 1977, p.193). Outcome expectation and perceived efficacy 
are both determinants of behavior, and both must be present to encourage a desired behavior.  
Therefore the present study incorporates both self efficacy, using past performance information, 
and outcome expectation through reward information.
5
  
Information sources influencing self efficacy perceptions 
For a given task, individuals may base self efficacy perceptions on four sources of 
information: (1) mastery experiences, (2) vicarious experiences, (3) verbal persuasion, and (4) 
psychological and emotional states (Bandura, 1977; 1995). The most influential source of 
information in developing efficacy perceptions is mastery experiences. Such experiences include 
one’s prior performance or accomplishments in similar situation (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, 
Adams, and Beyer, 1977; Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte et al., 1997). Prior successes in performing 
                                                          
5
 The focus of this study is how differences in self efficacy influence behavior. Thus, in the experiment self efficacy 
is manipulated (high and low) while outcome expectation is held constant across treatments. 
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a specific task will strengthen individual self efficacy, which contributes to the expectation that 
future performance will also be successful. In contrast, prior failures will weaken self efficacy, 
which contributes to the expectation of unsuccessful future performance.  
A second source of information contributing to perceived self efficacy is vicarious 
experience. Such experiences are based on the observation of others’ performance in similar 
situations. Observing others’ successes will influence individuals to believe that they also have 
the ability to accomplish a similar task. On the other hand, others’ failures related to a task will 
dampen one’s self efficacy and motivation in regard to a similar task (Bandura, 1995; Jacobs, 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1984; Stanley and Maddux, 1986).  
The third source of information influencing self efficacy is verbal or social persuasions 
received from others.  Persuasion can take the form of information from others that provides 
assurance that one has the capability to perform and master a task. Such persuasion can come 
from performance feedback or verbal encouragement. Individuals who receive positive 
persuasion are likely to form strong efficacy beliefs that remove their self doubt about their 
ability to perform the task successfully and will exert effort toward the task (Block and Keller, 
1995; Lindenmeier, 2008) 
The final source of self efficacy information includes psychological and emotional states. 
Emotional states such as anxiety, stress, arousal, and other moods, may influence individuals’ 
perceptions of self efficacy in a positive or negative direction (Bodin and Martinsen, 2004; 
Kavanagh and Bower, 1985). 
The impact of self efficacy on behavior 
Perceived self efficacy plays an important role on individuals’ behavior.  Self efficacy 
affects how individuals assess their ability and influences the actions that they will take in a 
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situation.  Individuals will perform tasks that they believe they are capable of completing. 
However, if they believe that they are incompetent in a certain area; they will avoid tasks related 
to that area.  
Zimmerman et al. (1992) examine the causal role of students’ self efficacy and academic 
goals in self-motivated academic settings. Based on path analysis procedures, the study confirms 
that students’ belief in their efficacy for self regulated learning influences their perception of 
their ability to attain academic achievements. Self efficacy influenced their perceived personal 
academic goals and their actual academic accomplishments. The findings from Zimmerman et al. 
(1992) indicate that self efficacy perceptions are important determinants of goals that will be set 
for a specific task and subsequent performance related to these goals.  
Efficacy beliefs also affect individuals’ effort and persistence related to specific tasks.  
Positive self efficacy encourages strong interest and commitment, more challenging goals, and 
high persistence of effort toward a task (Pajares, 2002). In an experimental setting, Jacobs et al. 
(1984) assess how persistence is affected by self efficacy, outcome expectation, and self 
awareness. Of these three variables, results indicate that self efficacy is the best predictor of 
persistence. Individuals with strong self efficacy perceptions view a task as a challenge to be 
embrace instead of a threat to be avoided.  Positive self efficacy will convey strong interest and 
commitment, more challenging goals, and high persistence of effort in the task (Pajares, 2002). 
Efficacy perceptions also impact individuals’ thought patterns and emotional reactions 
related to a task (Pajares, 2002).  Individuals with low self efficacy may believe that the task is 
too difficult to master and leads to negative emotional states, such as anxiety, stress, or 
depression. Such negative emotional states may prevent an individual from searching for the best 
 
 
22 
 
approach to solve the task.  Thus, emotional reactions will indirectly affect the actual degree of 
success one experiences in accomplishing a task.  
Self efficacy, prior performance, and budgetary slack 
The present study will utilize self efficacy theory to delineate the link between 
individuals’ past performance, self efficacy and future performance expectations.  As was 
discussed previously, mastery experiences are the most influential form of information used in 
developing self efficacy perceptions. Such experiences encompass prior performance on the task 
or similar tasks (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, and Beyer, 1977). Bandura (1997) affirms that 
individuals base their expectations of what they can achieve in the future on their past 
performance. This is especially true when individuals attribute their past successes or failures to 
factors within their control, such as ability, competence, or effort. Hence, past performance 
directly affects individuals’ expectations of future performance (Weiner, 1985).   
Numerous studies also confirm the relation between past performance and expectations 
of future performance. For example, Spieker and Hinsz (2004) investigate the role of repeated 
prior successes and failures on personal goal setting. They find that participants with past 
successes set their goals significantly higher than those with past failures. Webb, Jeffrey, and 
Schulz (2010) find evidence suggesting that past performance is positively related to current 
performance. Further, they find that employees with good prior performance were more likely to 
set realistic goals than employees with poorer prior performance. Audia, Locke, and Smith 
(2000) find that prior success creates satisfaction and confidence, and these traits affect 
individuals’ actions and strategies for the future. 
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Whyte et al. (1997) examine the role self efficacy plays in influencing individuals’ 
decisions to escalate commitment.
6
 The experimental manipulation of self efficacy in Whyte et 
al. (1997) consists of descriptions of prior performance successes (high self efficacy) and failures 
(low self efficacy) in prior performance. Their results indicate that self efficacy can exacerbate 
individuals’ decisions to escalate commitment to a failing activity. This occurs because 
individuals with high self efficacy believe in their ability to successfully perform the task and 
therefore persist with the investment despite evidence indicating that the project should be 
discontinued. Consequently, individuals with high self efficacy will invest more resources, exert 
greater effort, and take greater risks in order to save unprofitable projects.  Individuals with low 
self efficacy, however, will invest fewer resources and less effort due to their belief that they lack 
competence related to the task. 
This literature indicates that prior successes and failures influence self efficacy. In turn, 
self efficacy affects the decision making process. The current study will investigate the impact of 
self efficacy on managerial decisions to create budgetary slack. As mastery expectations or prior 
performance are the most influential information sources in the development of self efficacy 
perceptions, I will use prior performance information to manipulate self efficacy perceptions 
(Whyte et al., 1997). Specifically, in this setting, higher budgetary slack will increase the 
likelihood that participants will benefit monetarily, but it will be at the expense of the company. 
In contrast, the company desires managers to set budgets accurately. Thus, “good” prior 
performance will be defined as a history of setting the budget target accurately (i.e., neither too 
high nor too low).  
                                                          
6
 Staw and Ross (1987, p. 39) define escalation situations as “predicaments where costs are suffered in a course of 
action and subsequent activities have the potential either to reverse or compound one’s initial losses.” Escalation of 
commitment occurs when one continues to invest in an unprofitable project when discontinuing investment is more 
economically beneficial. Essentially, escalation reflects poor decision making as it indicates that individuals increase 
investment due to sunk costs, despite evidence suggesting that the investment should be discontinued. 
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Higher prior performance should contribute toward the development of high self efficacy. 
In turn, high self efficacy should contribute toward individuals’ beliefs that they have the ability 
to accomplish the task successfully. Specifically, individuals with high prior performance will 
feel capable of setting accurate cost targets, which should motivate them to try to maintain 
efficacy by setting future targets accurately. In other words, high prior performance should 
decrease the likelihood that individuals will set inaccurate targets or build in budgetary slack. In 
contrast, poor past performance should contribute toward individuals’ belief that they do not 
have the required ability to master the task.  Thus, as compared to individuals with high self 
efficacy, individuals with low self efficacy will be more likely to create budgetary slack. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Individuals with good prior performance will create less budgetary slack than those 
with poor prior performance. 
 
The Interaction of Horizontal Equity and Self Efficacy on Budgetary Slack Creation 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that horizontal inequity in compensation will increase individuals’ 
propensity to create budgetary slack. Hypothesis 2 draws from efficacy theory to predict that 
individuals with low self efficacy will be more likely to create slack than individuals with high 
self efficacy. However, there is reason to predict that perceptions of horizontal equity and self 
efficacy will interact to influence behavior, such that the main effect of efficacy is modified in 
the presence of horizontal inequity.   
Specifically, ignoring equity concerns, self efficacy theory predicts that individuals with 
high efficacy will be less likely to create slack due to their confidence in their ability to achieve a 
high level of performance. Individuals with high self efficacy view themselves as capable. When 
horizontal equity considerations are introduced, they are likely to be evaluated in reference to 
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one’s perceptions of efficacy. When there is horizontal inequity such that high efficacy 
individuals’ compensation is lower than peer compensation, high efficacy individuals are likely 
to feel that such inequity is unjustified and unfair. Thus, when faced with horizontal inequity, 
high efficacy individuals are likely to have a negative reaction. Recall that self efficacy theory 
indicates that emotional states related to efficacy perceptions also play a role in determining 
behavior in response to a task (Pajares, 2002). Further, equity theory indicates that individuals 
often respond to perceived inequity with negative actions intended to restore equity (Hollinger, 
1991). In the budgetary slack setting, slack creation is not the desired action from the perspective 
of the firm. Thus, slack creation is a tool that individuals can use to retaliate for perceived 
inequity. Therefore, horizontal inequity should increase the likelihood that high self efficacy 
individuals will create budgetary slack. This leads to the following hypothesized interaction:  
H3: Good prior performance will decrease budgetary slack creation when there is 
horizontal equity relative to when there is horizontal inequity. 
 
Ethical Ideology 
Individuals often differ in perceptions of whether certain practices are ethical or unethical 
(Schlenker and Forsyth, 1977).  Forsyth (1980, p. 183) proposes a typology of ethical ideology to 
explain variation between individuals’ moral judgments based on the assertion that “ in general 
people take particular stances regarding ethics and that the position taken will influence the 
judgment reached.” In Forsyth’s typology, individuals’ ethical position is based on two factors, 
relativism and idealism.   
According to Forsyth (1980), relativism relates to the extent one relies on universal moral 
principles or rules to direct the correct response to ethical issues. Individuals with high relativism 
reject the idea of relying on universal rules. Rather, the individuals with high relativism believe 
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that there are alternative perspectives that can be espoused to reach moral judgment. In other 
words, individuals high in relativism feel that the correct moral response is context specific. 
Hence, rather than using a universal rule for every ethical issue, a high relativist will analyze 
each issue to determine which rule to assume for solving each situation.  In contrast, a low 
relativist believes in the validity of universal rules and believes that such rules should be applied 
consistently without variation based on specific situational factors. To illustrate, an example of a 
universal moral rule might be that theft is morally wrong. A high relativist would argue that 
some contexts justify theft as a morally acceptable action, while a low relativist would argue that 
theft is wrong in any context.  
The second factor in Forsyth’s typology is idealism. Idealism relates to one’s beliefs in 
the relation between moral actions and outcomes. An idealist believes that a morally correct 
action always results in a positive outcome and a morally incorrect action always results in a 
negative outcome. In contrast, less idealistic individuals believe that moral and immoral actions 
can result in a combination of positive and negative outcomes.  Idealism can also be interpreted 
relative to the degree of individuals’ concern for the welfare of others (Forsyth, 1992).  For 
example, research and development costs may be cut to manage earnings for the period. Idealists 
would view the earnings management as always resulting in a negative outcome because it 
would harm others’ welfare (e.g., shareholder’s long-term wealth will be damaged). Therefore, 
idealist individuals would always avoid engaging in such earnings management. In contrast, non-
idealists perceive that acts may result in both positive and negative outcomes. Thus, a non-
idealist may see that although shareholder’s long-term wealth may be damaged, short-term 
profitability goals will be reached, which may have a positive impact on others’ welfare such as 
short-term stock price increases for shareholders because analysts’ forecasts were met allowing 
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employees evaluated on earnings targets to avoid negative evaluations, receive bonuses, or 
possibly even retain their jobs. Thus, non-idealist individuals may engage in this form of 
earnings management if they view it as necessary to achieve a desirable positive outcome.  
Forsyth (1980) argues that individuals’ ethical position ranges from high to low in the 
emphasis on principle (relativism) and the emphasis on consequences (idealism). Therefore, 
one’s ethical position exists somewhere on the spectrum between idealistic and relativistic.  
Forsyth (1980) classifies ethical positions into four types, based on the level of relativism and 
idealism, which are situationism, absolutism, subjectivism, and exceptionism (see Figure 1). 
Situationism refers to individuals who score high on relativism and idealism. Situationists 
reject universal moral principles in ethical issues since they believe that each issue must be 
analyzed individually. Situationists identify positive outcomes as the only acceptable 
consequences from moral acts. If an act creates negative or mixed results for others, then the act 
is immoral and needs to be avoided.  Absolutism refers to individuals with low relativism and 
high idealism. Absolutists acknowledge the application of universal moral principles in ethical 
issues. However, like situationists, absolutists only view an act as moral and acceptable if it only 
produces positive outcomes. 
Subjectivism relates to ethical positions which score high on relativism and low on 
idealism. A subjectivist rejects the idea of applying a universal moral principle for every ethical 
issue and feels that “negative consequences do not necessarily make an action immoral” 
(Barnett, Bass, and Brown, 1994, p.470). Exceptionism refers to individuals who score low on 
both relativism and idealism. Exceptionists recognize that moral acts can result in both positive 
and negative outcomes. Exceptionists accept the application of universal moral principles in 
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analyzing ethical issues but also agree to ignore the universal rule if they consider a different rule 
to be more applicable (Barnett et al., 1994). 
Ethical ideology and budgetary slack creation 
Previous studies document that individuals’ ethical ideology affects their judgments of 
ethical and unethical business practices and determines the practices they are willing to engage in 
(Barnett et al., 1994; Forsyth, 1992).  For example, Arrington and Reckers (1985) document 
significant relations between ethical position and non-economic judgments in tax evasion 
decisions (e.g., tax evaders’ social responsibility, tax evasion seriousness, and taxpayers’ 
perceptions of tax compliance as a social norm). Shaub, Finn and Munter (1993) examine the 
effects of auditors’ ethical ideology on ethical sensitivity and find that auditors scoring high on 
relativism are less likely to recognize ethical issues in their auditing assignments.  In addition, 
Greenfield, Norman and Wier (2008) find that idealistic individuals are less likely to engage in 
earnings management practices than relativistic individuals. Elias (2002) finds that absolutists 
and situationists view earnings managements as a more severe unethical issue than exceptionists 
and subjectivists. 
Recall that budgetary slack occurs when subordinates intentionally choose to withhold 
accurate information from their superiors (Sprinkle, 2003; Merchant, 1995; Merchant and 
Manzoni, 1989). Ethical dilemmas exist in decision making processes when the outcome or 
action may harm others (Velasquez and Rostankowski, 1985). Budgetary slack often poses 
negative consequences for the organization (Sprinkle, 2003; Merchant, 1995). Merchant (1995, 
p. 2) states that slack creation violates “role-related norms and desired virtues of professional 
managers and accountants.”  Therefore, the creation of budgetary slack is an ethical dilemma, 
which incorporates individuals’ moral judgment (Douglas and Wier, 2000).   
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Prior studies verify that ethical ideology influences decisions to create budgetary slack.  
A seminal study in this area, Douglas and Wier (2000), develops and tests a structural equation 
model that uses ethical position to explain managers’ decisions in creating budgetary slack.  In 
addition to ethical position, the model investigates whether budgetary slack is a function of 
managers’ participation in the budgeting process, the presence of information asymmetry, and 
incentives to create slack. Based on responses from 688 certified managers, the results indicate 
that, given the opportunity and incentives to create slack, ethical ideology is a significant 
explanatory factor of budgetary slack creation. The results indicate that negative relation 
between idealistic individuals and the decision to create budgetary slack. Conversely, the results 
affirm positive relation between relativistic individuals and the budgetary slack creation. 
Based on the association between ethical ideology and ethical dilemmas observed in 
various aspect of business practice, individuals’ ethical position is expected to influence their 
decision to engage in the creation of budgetary slack. Hence, ethical ideology is expected to 
moderate the impact of self efficacy and horizontal equity on slack creation behavior. Further, 
predictions for each of Forsyth’s (1980) four types of ethical positions are described in Figure 1 
and in the following paragraphs. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In general, high idealism and low relativism are expected to be negatively correlated with 
budgetary slack creation. Therefore, absolutists (high idealism and low relativism) are expected 
to create the least amount of budgetary slack relative to situationists, subjectivists, and 
exceptionists. Absolutists utilize universal moral principles, which would likely rule that 
opportunism and inaccuracy are wrong. In addition, absolutists would avoid acts which produce 
negative outcomes, such as the negative outcomes associated with budgetary slack for the firm 
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and its stakeholders. Thus, absolutists are postulated to most strongly perceive the creation of 
budgetary slack to be unethical.  
In contrast, subjectivists (low idealism and high relativism) are expected to create the 
most amount of budgetary slack of the four types of ethical positions. Subjectivists ignore the 
application of universal moral rules on ethical issues and analyze each ethical issue in a context 
specific manner. Thus, subjectivists are not expected to consider budgetary slack creation as 
unethical despite the negative consequences of the act.  
Situationists (high idealism and high relativism) and exceptionists (low idealism and low 
relativism) are expected to demonstrate some intermediate level of budgetary slack creation. 
Situationists will not honor universal moral principles, but will view budgetary slack creation as 
unethical due to its negative outcomes. Meanwhile, exceptionists honor universal moral 
principles, but will be willing to apply alternative rules and not condemn slack creation as 
immoral due to its potential for positive outcomes along with the negative outcomes.  
In summary, this study predicts that subjectivists and exceptionists, who score low in 
idealism, will less likely to view budgetary slack as unethical. Meanwhile, absolutists and 
situationists, who score high in idealism, will be more likely to classify budgetary slack creation 
as an immoral act. Consistent with Douglas and Wier (2000), the creation of budgetary slack is 
positively associated with relativism and negatively associated with idealism. This leads to the 
following hypotheses:  
H4: Higher idealism results in lower levels of slack creation. 
H5: Higher relativism results in higher levels of slack creation. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Experimental Design  
The hypotheses were tested using a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with ethical 
position as an additional measured variable. The two manipulated independent variables are 
horizontal equity (equal or unequal pay rate relative to a peer) and self efficacy (high or low 
prior performance in budget setting accuracy). Participants are randomly assigned to one of the 
four conditions. Ethical position is measured using Forsyth’s (1980) Ethical Position 
Questionnaire (EPQ). The experimental instrument is provided in the Appendix. 
Experimental Task 
All participants received a case with identical background information describing their 
role as a manager at a hypothetical manufacturing company.  The case briefly describes a 
company that has multiple production lines and production managers. The participants assumed 
the role of a production manager who is involved in the budgeting process. In particular, one task 
they are responsible for as manager is setting the target production costs that will be reported to 
the company each period. The funds transferred to the production department are determined by 
this target production cost set by the manager. The company expects that all production 
managers to set the cost target based on their best estimation of the actual cost. The case 
elaborates the negative consequences for the company if managers set the cost target too high or 
too low. If the cost target is too low, then the risk of a delay in the production process will 
emerge because the production line will not have sufficient funds to support the production.  
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Conversely, setting the cost target too high will create inefficiency for the company due to 
misallocation of funds.   
The case also explains that the manager has a private forecasting system that predicts the 
actual costs for the period with 75 percent accuracy (i.e., there is a 75 percent chance that the 
forecast will be equal to the actual costs and a 25 percent chance that the actual costs will be 
higher than the forecast). As the forecast is private, only the manager has knowledge of the 
forecast. The company only knows that the range of actual production costs is between $2,000 
and $6,000. Thus, the participant can choose to use the forecast as they wish when setting the 
production cost target for the period. 
Following the background information, participants received information regarding their 
compensation structure and past performance based on their treatment. These independent 
variables are described in more detail in a following section. After reading the case, participants 
answered questions designed to assess their likelihood of creating budgetary slack. They then 
answer manipulation check questions, additional questions to verify their understanding of the 
case, and a few additional questions about their perceptions of the issues presented in the case. 
Finally, they completed the ethical position questionnaire and answered a few demographic 
questions, such as age, gender, current class level, current GPA, number of years of work 
experience, employment status, and involvement in budgeting process.   
Independent Variables 
Horizontal Equity 
Prior studies document several alternatives for operationalizing horizontal equity in 
experimental settings (e.g., Matuszewski, 2010; Moser et al., 1995). In this study, a manager’s 
compensation rate relative to a peer manager’s compensation rate will be used to operationalize 
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horizontal equity. This operationalization is similar to Matuszewski (2010), which used relative 
salary levels to manipulate horizontal equity. Specifically, the experimental case will inform 
participants that production managers are peers and have the same gender, level of experience, 
job descriptions, responsibility, and work load. The compensation structure for production 
managers consists of a fixed wage and a share in the cost savings. Cost savings are defined as the 
excess of targeted production costs over actual production costs.  
For the horizontal equity treatment, participants are told that the fixed salary and the 
share in the cost savings are the same for all production managers. The compensation equation, 
which is the same for all production managers, is: 50% of cost savings (target cost - actual cost) 
per production cycle + fixed wage. 
In the horizontal inequity treatment, participants are told that the fixed salary is same for 
all production managers. However, the proportion of cost savings is different from the other 
production manager. The participants receive 50% share of their cost saving while their peers 
receive 95% share of cost savings. 
Self Efficacy 
Bandura (1995) describes four sources of self efficacy which are (1) mastery experiences, 
(2) vicarious experiences, (3) verbal persuasion, and (4) psychological and emotional states. The 
most influential source of self efficacy information is mastery experiences through individual’s 
prior performance or accomplishments in similar situation (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, and 
Beyer, 1977). Prior studies document methods to manipulate prior performance through 
information embedded in experimental task design (Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte, Saks, and Hook, 
1997).  
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Consistent with Whyte et al. (1997), this study manipulates participants’ perception of 
self efficacy by embedding information regarding participants’ prior performance to manage the 
production department and set accurate budgets. From this information, participants are expected 
to judge their capabilities in the task. This information is manipulated to provide participants 
with high self efficacy or low self efficacy. 
For the high self efficacy treatment, participants are provided with persuasive 
encouragement signaling that they possess the required ability to manage their production line. In 
high self efficacy condition, participants will read the following information: 
“Despite the difficulties of reporting accurate cost targets, you have established an 
excellent record for working efficiently and reporting accurate cost targets. Your prior 
performance in setting accurate cost targets is derived from your exceptional ability as a 
production manager. This obviously indicates that you have mastered the skills and the 
knowledge required to effectively and successfully manage your production line.” 
 
In the low self efficacy treatment, participants are informed that they did not have a good 
track record of working efficiently or reporting accurate production cost targets. For this 
condition the participants will receive information that their ability as a production manager is 
doubtful. The following statement is provided for the low self efficacy condition: 
“You have not established a record for working efficiently and reporting accurate 
production cost targets. Your poor prior performance in setting accurate cost targets 
makes it questionable whether your skills and knowledge are sufficient to effectively and 
successfully manage your production line.” 
 
Moderating Measured Variable – Ethical Position  
 The study will use the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) developed by Forsyth 
(1980). This questionnaire has been used extensively in prior research to measure participants’ 
ethical position (e.g., Arrington and Reckers, 1985; Douglas and Wier, 2000; Elias, 2002; 
Greenfield, Norman and Wier, 2008; Shaub, Finn and Munter, 1993). Davis, Andersen, and 
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Curtis (2001) evaluate the construct validity of the EPQ and find that the scale shows moderately 
high internal consistency. Further, Davis et al. note that the EPQ is a useful measure of ethical 
position and a tool for assessing individual variations in the ethical decision making process.  
The EPQ consists of 20 statements, divided into two sets of 10 statements each 
measuring idealism and relativism. Participants will rate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement using a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 which equals “completely agree” 
to 9 which equals “completely disagree.” EPQ will produce two scores, one score for idealism 
and the other for relativism. Each score is derived from summing the responses from idealism or 
relativism statements and divided it by 10. Following prior studies (i.e. Barnett et al., 1994; 
Elias, 2002; Forsyth and Nye, 1990), this study calculated the median scores for relativism and 
idealism. Further, participants’ scores were categorized into high or low relativism and idealism 
relative to the median. 
Manipulation and Understanding Checks 
Two manipulation check questions are available to verify that the participants understand 
the task and the manipulations on the instrument. The first manipulation check question relates to 
the horizontal equity manipulation. It requests that participants indicate the bonus rate received 
on their compensation structure. The answer options are either “less than my peer’s bonus rate” 
or “equal to my peer’s bonus rate”. The second manipulation check question relates to the self 
efficacy treatment. Participants will indicate, based on the prior performance information 
provided in the case, whether they lack or have sufficient ability as production manager.  
Participants who did not understand the manipulations are expected to fail to provide 
correct answers for the manipulation checks. Thus, these participants will be excluded from the 
primary analyses. However, analyses both with and without the participants that fail the 
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manipulation checks will be compared to ascertain the impact on the results of omitting these 
participants.  
In addition to the manipulation check questions, participants were asked several questions 
intended to verify their understanding of important information provided in the case.  First, 
participants were asked to state the level of accuracy of their private forecasting system. The next 
question asks participants to indicate whether their total compensation would increase if their 
cost target exceeds actual production costs. Participants provide their answer on an 11-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 0 which equals “strongly disagree” to 10 which equals “strongly 
agree.” 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of interest for this study is the likelihood of budgetary slack 
creation. Participants are given a forecast of actual production costs. The budgetary slack 
variable is the difference between the submitted production cost target and the forecasted 
production costs. Participants were asked a series of questions to obtain information about their 
intentions to create budgetary slack.  
General Propensity to Deviate from the Forecast 
First, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood of whether, in general, they would 
report a cost target that is different than the forecasted amount. Participants responded using a 
Likert-type scale with endpoints labeled “Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost 
that is less than the forecast”, and “Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is 
higher than the forecast”. The midpoint of the scale will be labeled “Will most likely report a 
targeted production cost equal to the forecast”.  Reponses from this question are used to test the 
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impact of the independent variables on participants’ general propensity to deviate from the 
forecast.  
Numerical Point Estimates of Budgetary Slack 
Next, participants were asked three questions about the production cost targets they 
would set in response to three specific forecasts.  The questions assume the forecast amount to be 
$225,000, $400,000 or $575,000. As the range of possible costs is $200,000 to $600,000, these 
amounts are designed to obtain responses for a low, medium, and high forecast, respectively. In 
turn, these forecasts provide participants with high, medium, or low opportunity to create slack, 
respectively. The task requires participants to state the amount that they will report as their 
budgeted production cost in response to each of these forecasts. Participants indicated their cost 
target amount using a scale ranging from $200,000 to $600,000. For each of these three 
questions, the forecast is subtracted from the participant’s indicated production cost target to 
obtain a measure of budgetary slack.  
Pilot testing 
  A pilot test was conducted at a public university. The objective of pilot testing is to 
ensure the clarity and effectiveness of the instrument in capturing the required responses from 
the participants. In addition, a pilot test allows for a preliminary evaluation for the manipulations 
used on the instrument. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
Participants and Sample Size        
The participants for this experiment consist of 162 graduate business students from a 
public university in United States. Twenty-eight participants did not pass the manipulation check 
and were eliminated from the analyses. Thus, the final sample size for this study is 134 
participants. The mean grade-point average (GPA) is 3.36 out of 4.00. In addition, the majority 
of the participants were MBA students (59 percent) while the remaining participants were 
enrolled in other graduate programs such as Master of Accounting, Master of Science in Global 
Marketing, Finance, Information System, and Business Analytics.  
Demographic Data        
Eighty-five participants (63.4 percent) are male and 49 participants (36.6 percent) are 
female. Participants’ average age is 27 years (range of 21 to 63 years). The majority (74 percent) 
of the participants self report that they are currently employed, and the mean professional 
employment experience is 5.22 years.  Additionally, 42 percent of participants claimed to have 
been involved in the budgeting process during their professional employment. Moreover, 
participants indicated their agreement to the statement that it is unethical to intentionally 
misreport a production cost target or to create budget slack (mean response of 7.69 on a 10 point 
of scale). Demographic data and correlations of the variables on the sample are summarized in 
Table 1 and 2, respectively. 
     [Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
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Manipulation and Understanding Checks 
Manipulation Checks 
The objective of manipulation checks in an instrument is to assure that the participants 
understand the task and/or the experimental manipulations. The manipulation check section for 
this experiment consisted of questions regarding the assigned treatments. The first manipulation 
check question related to the horizontal equity treatment (equal or unequal). Specifically, 
participants were asked to identify their bonus rate based on the case that they just read. From the 
total sample, 80 and 82 participants were assigned to the equal and unequal treatments, 
respectively. Five participants from the unequal treatment and three participants from the equal 
treatment answered this manipulation check incorrectly. To further verify the effectiveness of the 
horizontal equality manipulation, participants were also asked whether they agreed with the 
following statement: “the compensation structure among the production manager is fair.” They 
responded using a 10-point Likert scale, where 0 indicates that they “strongly disagree”, 5 
indicates that they are “neutral”, and 10 indicates that they “strongly agree”. For participants 
assigned to the unequal treatment, the anticipated response is disagreement (i.e., a scale response 
from 0 to 4) due to their receipt of a lower bonus rate than their peer. Among the 82 participants 
assigned to the unequal treatment, 61 indicate their response correctly, and nine respond as 
neutral (Mean = 2.40, Std. Deviation = 2.512). 
The last question in the manipulation check section related to the manipulation of self 
efficacy (low or high). Based on the task, participants were asked to choose a statement that 
accurately reflects their ability as production manager as described in the experimental 
instrument. Seventy-three and 89 participants were assigned to high and low self efficacy 
treatments, respectively. In the high self efficacy treatment, four participants failed the 
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manipulation check. A higher rate of failure was observed in the low self efficacy treatment with 
18 out of 89 participants responding incorrectly.  The frequency of failure under high and low 
self efficacy is significantly different (Pearson Chi Square = 7.43, p = 0.006). This higher rate of 
failure in the low self efficacy treatment is of interest. Low self efficacy is manipulated in the 
instrument by indicating that the individual had poor prior performance. Participants receive 
information regarding a prior inability to set the cost target accurately indicating that their skills 
as production manager are questionable. One plausible explanation for the higher level of 
manipulation check failure for this treatment is attribution theory
7
. The theory predicts that 
individuals tend to associate negative outcome to external causes or refuse to assign internal 
attribution to negative performance. Aligned with the theory, Xu and Tuttle (2005) document the 
association between poor accounting performance and external attributions.  Thus, consistent 
with attribution theory, it is difficult for participants to internalize low self efficacy information. 
The poor prior performance information may conflict with participants’ existing self-beliefs 
about their ability. Therefore, by filtering the sample based on the passing of manipulation 
checks criteria, the study assures that the analyses are derived from participants that understood 
the task and internalized the experimental treatments. 
The 27 participants who incorrectly answered one or both of the manipulation check 
questions were eliminated from the sample. In addition, one participant who did not respond to 
the manipulation checks section was also excluded from further analyses. Thus, 134 participant 
                                                          
7
 This theory is first proposed by Heider in 1958. Attribution Theory suggests that individuals perceived, gathered, 
examined, and combined information in order to be able to create a causal judgment for an event (Fisher and Taylor, 
1991).  Heider (1958) proposed that in the process of understanding the reasons that caused a behavior, individuals 
use either internal or external attributions. Internal attributions refer to attitude, character, or personality traits. While 
external attributions relate to situation or environmental conditions.  
Heider (1958) further argues that individuals tend to explain the behavior of others using internal attributions (e.g. 
personality traits).  In other hand, individuals tend to explain their own behavior using external attributions (e.g. 
situational or environment). 
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responses are used for the analyses
8
. The demographic statistics for the 134 participants passing 
the manipulation checks are approximately identical to those of the full sample including 
participants who failed the manipulation checks.  
Understanding Checks 
 The instrument contains two questions that test whether participants understand the case 
and the task assigned. The first question asked participants to indicate the accuracy of the 
forecast systems. Ninety percent of participants answered this question correctly. Another 
question elicits information regarding participants’ understanding that the budgeting process 
described in the case results in a slack inducing setting. Specifically, participants were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the following statement: “My bonus will increase if my production 
cost target is higher than actual production cost.”  They responded using a 10-point Likert scale, 
where 0 indicates that they “strongly disagree”, 5 indicates that they are “neutral”, and 10 
indicates that they “strongly agree”. The correct answer for this question, regardless of treatment, 
is agreement (i.e., a response of 6 to 10 on the scale). Out of 134 participants, 104 provided a 
correct response, 8 submitted neutral as their response, and 22 answered incorrectly by providing 
a scale response below 5.  Overall, these responses suggest that the participants understand the 
case and the task required in the experiment. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables        
Table 2 displays the correlation among the dependent variables. The likelihood to deviate 
from forecast or the intention to create budget slack is significantly positively correlated with the 
numerical budget slack created in all opportunity. Table 3 summarizes the cell means for the 
                                                          
8
 The hypotheses tests are repeated using the full sample (n = 162). The findings are consistent as those from the 
analysis using subset of sample of participants who passed the manipulation check (n = 134). 
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dependent variables of interest, the likelihood of forecast deviation and point estimates of slack 
creation in response to specific forecasts providing high, medium, and low opportunity for slack 
creation. Panel A displays the cell means for the likelihood of deviation from the forecast. The 
mean deviation likelihood is higher for the horizontal equity treatment as compared to horizontal 
inequity treatment (Mean = 6.79 vs. 6.74, t = -0.161, two-tailed p value = 0.872). This pattern of 
mean differences is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1. The mean deviation likelihood is higher for 
the low self efficacy treatment than the high self efficacy treatment (Mean = 6.82 vs. 6.70, t = 
0.387, two-tailed p value = 0.699). Although this difference is statistically insignificant, this 
pattern of means provides initial support for Hypothesis 2, which predicts that individuals with 
good prior performance will create less budgetary slack than those with poor prior performance.  
 Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the second set of dependent 
variables – the point estimates of slack creation in response to specific forecasts providing high, 
medium, and low opportunity for slack creation.
9
 The mean slack creation for the horizontal 
equity treatment is $94.02 (Std. Deviation = 85.49) when there is high opportunity, $60.00 (Std. 
Deviation = 58.34) when there is medium opportunity, and -$1.06 (Std. Deviation = 45.20) when 
there is low opportunity. The mean slack creation for the horizontal inequity treatment is $90.96 
(Std. Deviation = 79.92) when there is high opportunity, $55.22 (Std. Deviation = 70.76) when 
there is medium opportunity, and -$3.90 (Std. Deviation = 66.26) when there is low opportunity. 
However, none of these mean differences are significant. The two tailed p values under high, 
medium, and low opportunity are 0.831, 0.671, and 0.773, respectively.  These means indicate 
that the mean slack creation was higher under horizontal equity than under horizontal inequity 
treatment for all opportunity levels. This is not consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts that 
higher slack will be created under horizontal inequity than under horizontal equity. 
                                                          
9
 The unit measurement for the numerical slack is in thousands of dollars. 
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 Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there is higher mean slack creation across opportunity 
levels under the low self efficacy treatment than under the high self efficacy treatment. The mean 
slack created in the low self efficacy treatment is $94.63 (Std. Deviation = 84.40) when there is 
high opportunity, $58.97 (Std. Deviation = 61.94) when there is medium opportunity, and $1.84 
(Std. Deviation = 38.95) when there is low opportunity. The mean slack created in the high self 
efficacy treatment is $90.23 (Std. Deviation = 80.90) when there is high opportunity, $56.14 
(Std. Deviation = 67.94) when there is medium opportunity, and -$6.97 (Std. Deviation = 70.50) 
when there is low opportunity. However, none of the mean differences in slack creation between 
high and low self efficacy are statistically significant (p-values for high, medium, and low 
opportunity are 0.758, 0.801, and 0.370, respectively). 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
Measure of Ethical Position  
 Ethical Position is measured using Forsyth’s Ethical Positions Questionnaire (EPQ). The 
EPQ is comprised of two sets of 10 statements to measure idealism and relativism. Participants 
provided their responses to the EPQ statements on a 9-point Likert scale where 1 represents 
“completely agree” and 9 represents “completely disagree”. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the 
idealism and relativism scales are 0.866 and 0.823, respectively.  
Idealism and relativism scores are calculated based on the average of the responses to 
each of the sets of 10 statements. Two participants were eliminated from the ethical positions 
analyses due to incomplete responses to the EPQ. The overall mean and median idealism scores 
are 6.14 and 6.30, respectively. For relativism, overall mean and median scores are 5.11 and 
5.00, respectively. Further, participants are classified as having high or low idealism and 
relativism using median scores as cut-off points (Bartnett et al., 1994; Elias, 2002; Forsyth and 
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Nye, 1990). This results in 68 participants classified as low idealists and 64 participants 
classified as high idealists. Coincidently, there are also 68 participants that classified as low 
relativists and 64 participants classified as high relativists.   
Potential Covariates 
 Demographic variables (such as age, class level, GPA, gender, employment status, years 
of professional employment experience, and experience in budgeting setting), risk preference, 
and perceptions of budget slack creation were evaluated as potential covariates. The evaluation 
consisted of analyzing the association of the potential variables to the dependent variables.  The 
negative Pearson correlation of 0.217 between gender and the likelihood of forecast deviation is 
significant with a two-tailed p-value = 0.01. The analyses also suggest significant correlation 
between gender and slack creation under high and medium opportunity (Pearson correlation of -
0.262 and -0.188, respectively) with a two-tailed p-value ≤ 0.05. Because of this significant 
association, gender is included as a covariate in hypothesis testing. Table 2 summarized the 
correlations among the dependent variables and the potential covariates. 
Tests of Hypotheses  
The analyses use the likelihood to deviate from forecast and point estimates of slack 
creation in response to specific forecasts as dependent variables. Horizontal equity and self 
efficacy are independent variables with gender as a potential covariate. General Linear Model 
analysis is employed to test the main effects of horizontal equity (Hypothesis 1), self efficacy 
(Hypothesis 2), and their interaction effect (Hypothesis 3) on budgetary slack creation. First, an 
analysis of covariance ANCOVA is used to test the effect of the independent variables on the 
first dependent variable measure, participants’ general likelihood of deviating from the forecast 
while controlling for gender. Next, repeated measures ANCOVA is used to analyze participants’ 
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responses to the three specific forecasts. The repeated dependent variable is the three calculated 
point estimates of budgetary slack obtained from participants’ responses to the three specific 
forecasts. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 predict the association of ethical position on slack creation. Mean 
analysis and correlation tests are conducted to test these hypotheses.  Following Hastings and 
Finegan (2011), hierarchical regression analyses were employed to analyze the interactions 
among ethical positions and horizontal equity, and self efficacy. 
Likelihood of Forecast Deviation 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the ANCOVA used to test the effect of the 
independent variables on participants’ likelihood of deviating from the forecast, while 
controlling for gender. The ANCOVA results indicate that gender is a statistically significant 
covariate (p = 0.008). The results indicate no significant main effects for horizontal equity (p = 
0.836) or self efficacy (p = 0.859) on the likelihood to deviate from the forecast. However, the 
results indicate a marginally significant interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy (p 
= 0.078), which is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the 
likelihood of deviating from the forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self 
efficacy is low. The opposite pattern emerges under horizontal equity, such that the likelihood of 
deviating from the forecast is lower when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. 
The significance of the interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy may suppress the 
individual main effects of the independent variables.  
 A minority of the experimental participants (25 out of 134) indicated that they would 
report a cost that was less than the forecast, resulting in the creation of negative slack. Such a 
response would result in the receipt of less than adequate funds to cover the forecasted costs. 
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Such a choice is inconsistent with preferences for wealth or accuracy from the perspective of the 
incentive structure set up in the experimental design. Thus, similar to prior studies (e.g., Evans et 
al. 2001), the analyses are also conducted with these observations excluded. Specifically, the 
ANCOVA analysis was conducted using the subset of observations from the 109 participants 
who report costs equal to the forecast or greater (i.e., participant who create zero or positive 
budgetary slack). Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of this additional analysis. The overall 
results are similar from the prior analysis. Gender is significant (p = 0.003), and the main effects 
for the independent variables are not significant. However the statistical significance of the 
interaction is stronger (p = 0.026).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 A simple main effect analysis of differences in the estimated marginal means was 
performed to examine the reported significant interactions between horizontal equity and self 
efficacy on the likelihood to deviate from the forecast. Table 5 displays the results from the 
simple main effects analysis while Figure 2 illustrates the interactions of the estimated marginal 
means. The level of self efficacy influenced the likelihood to deviate from the forecast when an 
equal horizontal equity is presence (F = 1.898, p = 0.085). However, the influence of self 
efficacy is not significant to the intention on slack creation under unequal horizontal equity (F = 
1.286, p = 0.129). Therefore, participants with low self efficacy treatment shows a significantly 
higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with high efficacy treatment, when 
they receive equal horizontal equity. This result provides initial support for Hypothesis 2. 
Horizontal equity influenced the likelihood to deviate from forecast under low self 
efficacy treatment (F = 2.000, p = 0.080), but not under high self efficacy treatment (F = 1.220, p 
= 0.135). Specifically, under high self efficacy, participants with unequal horizontal equity 
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treatment indicate a higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with equal 
horizontal equity. Although the pattern is consistent with the direction of the predicted 
interaction on Hypothesis 3, however the mean difference is not statistically significant. 
Panel B on Table 5 and Figure 2 displays the results of the simple main effects analysis 
using subset of responses from participants who create a zero and or positive budgetary slack. 
The level of self efficacy influenced the likelihood to deviate from the forecast under the 
presence of unequal horizontal equity (F = 4.223, p = 0.021), but not under equal horizontal 
equity (F = 1.314, p = 0.127). Specifically, participants with high self efficacy treatment show a 
significantly higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with low efficacy 
treatment, when they receive unequal horizontal equity. 
Horizontal equity significantly influenced the likelihood to deviate from forecast under 
high self efficacy (F = 3.197, p = 0.039) and low self efficacy treatment (F = 1.990, p = 0.081). 
The means patterns are consistent with Hypothesis 3. As predicted, participants with unequal 
horizontal equity treatment indicate a significantly higher intention to create budget slack, as 
compare to those with equal horizontal equity, when they receive high self efficacy treatment. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 [Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 about here] 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Slack Creation 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the repeated measures ANCOVA used to 
analyze participants’ responses (n = 134) to the three specific forecasts while controlling for 
gender. The results indicate that gender is a statistically significant covariate (p = 0.021), but 
reveal no significant main effects of horizontal equity (p = 0.654) or self efficacy (p = 0.705) on 
budgetary slack creation. The interaction term is also insignificant (p = 0.827). Moreover, Panel 
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B of Table 6 summarized the results from the analysis using subset of responses from the 109 
participants who report costs equal to the forecast or greater. The findings are consistent as the 
prior analysis. Gender is a statistically significant covariate (p = 0.009). There is no significant 
main effects from horizontal equity (p = 0.934), self efficacy (p = 0.782), nor significant 
interaction terms from both variables (p = 0.480).  Figure 3 illustrates this interaction. 
Interestingly, the interaction plot from the analysis of subset of responses of participants who 
create slack (see Panel B of Figure 3) is consistent to the significant interactions which found on 
the intention to deviate from forecast (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the results from the analysis 
of the point estimates of slack creation do not support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here] 
Ethical Position 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that budgetary slack creation will decrease as idealism increases.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that slack creation will increase as relativism score is increases. To test 
these hypotheses, I examine mean differences and correlation analyses between the dependent 
variables of interest and the ethical position scores. The results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 4 and 5. The results for mean analysis and correlation between the dependent 
variables and ethical position scores are summarized in Table 7, and the results of the 
hierarchical regressions are reported in Tables 8, 9, and 10. 
Mean and Correlation Analysis 
 As Panel A of Table 7 reports, the mean likelihood of deviating from the forecast is 
significantly higher for participants with a low idealism compared to those with a high idealism 
(Mean = 7.10 vs. 6.40, t = 2.184, p = 0.031). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, this suggests that 
individuals with low idealism scores report higher intentions to create slack than high idealism 
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individuals. In addition, the likelihood to deviate from the forecast is negatively correlated with 
the idealism score (Pearson correlation of -0.186). Similar to the intention to create slack, the 
numerical slack created under all opportunities is negatively correlated with the idealism score. 
The pattern of mean point estimates of slack in response to the three forecasts is also consistent 
with Hypothesis 4, especially under high and medium opportunity; however the mean 
differences are not statistically significant.  
 As Panel B of Table 7 reports, the mean of likelihood of deviating from the forecast for 
high relativists is higher than for low relativists. However this difference is not statistically 
significant (Mean = 6.89 vs. 6.60, t = -0.872, p = 0.385). Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the 
relativism score is significantly positively correlated with budgetary slack creation under high 
and medium opportunity. Further, the mean analysis shows that high relativists create 
significantly higher budgetary slack compared to low relativist under high opportunity (p = 
0.025) and medium opportunity (p = 0.023). Thus, the mean patterns and the correlation analysis 
provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 5.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
 The hierarchical regressions analyses include two independent variables (horizontal 
equity and self efficacy), the dependent variables (the likelihood to deviate from forecast and 
numerical budgetary slack created), ethical position (idealism and relativism), and gender as 
covariate. The idealism and relativism variables used in the analysis are in the form of 
categorical variables that classifies the observations to high or low idealism and relativism scores 
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based on the median split (Bartnett et al., 1994; Elias, 2002; Forsyth and Nye, 1990)
10
. The first 
step of the analysis entered gender as a covariate. The second step entered the variables of 
interest, which are equity, efficacy and ethical positions. The remaining phases of the analysis 
entered the two, three and four way interactions terms sequentially. Following Hastings and 
Finegan (2011), higher-order effects were interpreted only if the addition of the variables is 
significant to the amount of variance accounted for. In other words, the interpretation of the 
result will be conducted if the change in R
2 
is significant. Table 8 summarizes the steps that were 
taken in the hierarchical analysis.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Forecast Deviation 
 Table 9 reports the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the first 
dependent variable of interest, the intention to deviate from the forecast. Based on the first step 
analysis, the result suggest that males reported a higher intention to deviate from the forecast or 
to create slack than females (β = -0.22, p = 0.01). Thus gender is a statistically significant (F (1, 
130) = 6.77, p = 0.01) variable explaining five percent of variance in the intention to deviate 
from the forecast. The introduction of horizontal equity, self efficacy, idealism, and relativism 
explained an additional three percent of variance in the intention to create budget slack, after 
controlling for gender (R
2
 Change = 0.03, F (4, 126) = 1.027, p = 0.396). The second model is 
marginally significant (F = 2.177, p = 0.061). However, Leech, Barret, and Morgan, (2011, p. 
125) warned that one cannot use this to interpret whether the second model is better than the 
prior model. Leech et al. suggest that the second model can still be significant without its 
advancing to a significant degree on the first model. The results from the second model shows 
                                                          
10
 Additional hierarchical multiple regression analyses are conducted using idealism and relativism as continuous 
variables as opposed to dichotomous variables. The findings are consistent with those from the analyses using 
ethical position in the form of categorical variable. 
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that idealism is a marginally significant (p = 0.073) predictor for the second model. However, 
since the changes of R
2
 are not significant, one cannot conclude that idealism can be accounted 
for significant variance over and above gender for the reported intention on slack creation. As 
displayed in Table 9, there were no significant two, three, or four way interactions among 
horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical positions over the intention to create budgetary slack.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Numerical Estimates of Slack Creation 
 Table 10 displays the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the 
numerical budgetary slack created under high, medium, and low opportunity. Based on the first 
model of the analysis, gender significantly predicts the budgetary slack created under high 
opportunity (β = -0.253, p = 0.003) and medium opportunity (β = -0.193, p = 0.027). However as 
indicated by the R
2
, only six percent and three percent of the variance of slack created under high 
and medium opportunity could be predicted by gender.  
 Further, the results from the second phase suggest that all the newly entered variables 
(horizontal equity, self efficacy, and ethical position) are able to increase the R
2
; however none 
of the changes in R
2
 are statistically significant. Nevertheless, the second model itself is 
statistically significant, especially under high (p = 0.019) and medium (p = 0.066) opportunity. 
In the second model, relativism appears to be a significant predictor of slack created under high 
(p = 0.028) and medium (p = 0.025) opportunity.  However, since the changes of R
2
 are not 
significant under both conditions, then the analysis cannot reasonably determine that relativism 
can account for significant variance over and above gender for the reported point estimates of 
slack creation. 
In the fourth model including the addition of three way interactions, the coefficient of the 
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interaction among equity, idealism, and relativism is significant (p = 0.043) under the medium 
opportunity condition. However, since the addition of the variables to the new model is not 
significant, or the changes of R
2
 are not significant, then this study will not interpret this 
interaction. Similar with the intention to deviate from the forecast variable, the analyses indicate 
that there are no significant two, three, or four way interactions among horizontal equity, self 
efficacy and ethical position. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Additional Analyses 
Gender Effect 
The ANCOVA analyses in the prior discussion indicate that gender is a significant 
covariate in predicting the likelihood of forecast deviation and numerical estimates of budgetary 
slack. Table 11 presents mean dependent variable scores by gender. These means reveal that 
males are consistently more likely to create slack than females. T-tests of mean differences 
indicate that men report a significantly higher likelihood of forecast deviation in the direction of 
slack creation than women (p = 0.012). In addition, males create significantly more slack than 
females when there is a high opportunity (p = 0.033) and medium opportunity (p = 0.030).  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Likelihood of Forecast Deviation based on Peers’ Behavior 
 There are two exit questions in the instrument that asked for participants’ intention to 
create budgetary slack given information about whether their peers would create slack. The first 
question assumes that the peer always creates budget slack, while the second question assumes 
that the peer never creates budget slack. The objective for these questions is to examine whether 
participants’ intentions to create budgetary slack is altered given their peers’ decisions regarding 
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slack creation. It is expected that additional information indicating that a horizontal peer always 
(or never) creates budgetary slack will provide participants with additional justification to report 
(or not to report) costs that result in slack creation. In addition, the associations between the 
responses from these exit questions and the participants’ ethical positions were further analyzed.  
The study examines the responses using repeated measure ANCOVA. Horizontal equity, self 
efficacy, idealism, and relativism were analyzed as independent variables while holding gender 
as a control variable. The results from the analysis are displayed in Table 12.  
The results provide additional support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. Regardless of the 
knowledge regarding the horizontal peer, the responses suggest that gender is a significant 
covariate for the intention to deviate from forecast (p = 0.005). There are no significant main 
effect of equity (p = 0.328) and efficacy (p = 0.785). Further, idealism (p = 0.012) and relativism 
(p = 0.045) are significant predictors for the likelihood to deviate from the forecast regardless the 
information regarding horizontal peer. The analysis reveal no significant interaction terms 
between equity and efficacy (p = 0.821) nor between idealism and relativism (p = 0.754). Panel 
B of Table 12 reported the similar results for the same analyses using a subset of observations 
from participants that create budgetary slack (n = 109). 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Understanding Check – Sensitivity Analysis 
 The hypothesis testing above was repeated using subset of sample which excludes the 22 
participants that fail the understanding check. This additional analysis is conducted to determine 
the robustness of the results had the analyses were performed using responses from participants 
that understand the case. Table 13 through 18 summarized the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
Table 13 displays the results from ANCOVA analysis on the intention to slack creation from 
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excluding participants that fail the understanding check (n= 112). The results reveal that gender 
is significant (p = 0.045) and no main effect from horizontal equity (p = 0.624) and self efficacy 
(p = 0.563). The significance of the interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy is not 
robust (p = 0.117). Panel B of Table 13 shows the result of the ANCOVA analysis using 
responses from participants who correctly answer the understanding check and create a zero or 
positive budget slack (n = 96). The analysis reveals that the results are consistent with those from 
including the participants who failed the understanding checks. Gender is still significant 
predictor for the likelihood to create budget slack (p = 0.022). No indication of main effects from 
horizontal equity (p = 0.793) and self efficacy (p = 0.728). However, the interaction between 
horizontal equity and self efficacy is significant (p = 0.065).  
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
Table 14 summarized the repeated measures ANCOVA analysis for the numerical budget 
slack crated. The results indicate that gender is no longer significant (p = 0.208). The remaining 
results are consistent to those from including participants regardless their answer to the 
understanding checks (n = 112).  The main effects from the horizontal equity (p = 0.727), and 
self efficacy (p = 0.352), also the interaction from equity and efficacy (p = 0.766) are not 
statistically significant. Whereas, Panel B of Table 14 reported the result from the participants 
that decided to create budget slack (n = 96). The results are consistent to the findings displayed 
on Table 6. Gender is significant at p value of 0.009. No indication of main effects of horizontal 
equity (p = 0.934), self efficacy (p = 0.782), and interaction (p = 0.480) between equity and 
efficacy on the numerical budget slack creation.  
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
 Table 15 and 17 reported the results from the hierarchical regression analysis to examine 
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the moderator effects from ethical position in the budgetary slack creation using responses from 
participants that understand the case (n = 112).  Whereas Table 16 and 18 summarized the same 
analysis using responses from participants who decided to create budget slack (n = 96).  
 Gender is a significant predictor for intention to deviate from forecast on both analyses of 
subset of participants that understands the case (p = 0.051) and who create budget slack (p = 
0.03). As shown on Table 15, on the second model of the analysis, idealism is a marginally 
significant predictor for the intention to create slack. However, this study would not interpret this 
result further since the model itself is not significant (p = 0.152). Moreover, interpretable result is 
presence on the analysis from the subset of participants that create budget slack (see Table 16). 
The findings suggest that the second model is better than the first model (R
2
 Change = 0.091, p = 
0.059). Therefore, idealism accounted for significant variance over and above the covariate 
variable, which is gender, for the intention to create budgetary slack. In addition, as reported on 
Table 17 and 18, gender is significant for the numerical budgetary slack created under high 
opportunity on both analyses of subset of participants that understand the case (p = 0.046) and 
who create budget slack (p = 0.074). Consistent with the prior analysis, there is no indication of 
any significant interaction among the variables of interest across all analyses. 
[Insert Table 15, 16, 17, and 18 about here] 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary and Discussion 
A vast stream of accounting research suggests the importance of incorporating non 
pecuniary preferences in the analyses of judgment and decision making process. This study 
contributes to the literature by providing experimental evidence regarding the influence of 
horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical position on budgetary slack creation.  
Four research questions were analyzed through a 2 x 2 experiment using graduate 
students as participants. The first research question is whether managers’ decision to create 
budgetary slack is influence by their horizontal equity preferences. This question is examined by 
testing Hypothesis 1, which consistent with equity theory, predicts individuals who perceive 
horizontal inequity will create more budgetary slack than those with horizontal equity. 
Contradictory to Hypothesis 1, the mean for reported intention to create budgetary slack or the 
likelihood to deviate from the forecast is higher for participants with equal horizontal equity 
treatment than those with unequal horizontal equity treatment. In addition, the T-test suggests 
that the mean difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.699). Further, a similar mean pattern 
and insignificant mean differences are also present for the numerical budgetary slack created. 
The ANCOVA and repeated measure ANCOVA analyses indicate an insignificant main effect of 
horizontal equity on both the dependent variable of interest likelihood to deviate from the 
forecast, and the numerical slack created. These results provide evidence that Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported indicating no significant effect of horizontal equity on budgetary slack creation.  
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The second research question purposes whether the decision in creating budgetary slack 
is affected by managers’ self efficacy. As self efficacy theory suggests, this study expects that 
individuals’ poor prior performance will contribute toward their belief that they do not have the 
required ability to perform the task. Therefore, this will encourage them to create more slack 
compared to individuals’ with good prior performance. The mean for likelihood to deviate from 
the forecast is higher for individuals who received low self efficacy treatment than those with 
high self efficacy treatment. However, the result from the T-test analysis suggests that the mean 
difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.872). Further, the similar results emerge from 
mean analyses for numerical slack created on high, medium, and low opportunity levels. The 
averages of numerical slack created across all opportunity levels are higher under the low self 
efficacy compare to high self efficacy treatment. The mean patterns provide an initial support for 
Hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, none of the mean difference is statistically significant, perhaps 
attributed to the low power of the test due to a small sample. The ANCOVA and repeated 
measure ANCOVA analyses also suggest that the main effect of self efficacy on budgetary slack 
creation is not statistically significant. Accordingly the analyses provide the evidence of self 
efficacy alone does not significantly influence the decision to create budgetary slack, not 
supporting Hypothesis 2.  
The third research question examines the interaction between horizontal equity and 
managers’ self efficacy on budgetary slack creation decisions. Results indicate that horizontal 
equity and self efficacy interact to affect the likelihood of deviating from the forecast to create 
slack as hypothesized. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the likelihood of deviating from 
the forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. The opposite 
pattern emerges under horizontal equity, such that the likelihood of deviating from the forecast is 
 
 
58 
 
lower when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. Conversely, the significant 
interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy is not presence on the analyses of 
numerical estimations of slack creation. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported; specifically the 
interaction of horizontal equity and self efficacy significantly influences the reported intention to 
create budgetary slack.  
 The final research question relates to the influence of ethical position on the decision to 
create budgetary slack. Hypothesis 4 predicts the negative association between idealism and 
budgetary slack creation. Meanwhile, Hypothesis 5 predicts the positive association between 
relativism and the decision to create slack. The means and correlation analyses provide 
preliminary supports for both Hypothesis 4 and 5. The study then further examines the involving 
interactions among ethical positions, horizontal equity, and self efficacy through Hierarchal 
Multiple Regression analysis. The findings support Hypothesis 4 that idealism is a significant 
predictor of the reported likelihood to deviate from forecast. Consistent with Douglas and Wier 
(2000), the result suggest that there is a negative relation between idealism score and reported 
intention to create slack. This finding is expected given the characteristics of relative idealist 
would consider budgetary slack creation as an unethical act due to the negative consequences 
from the decision.  
Whereas for the relativism analysis, the results indicate that relativism is a significant 
predictor for the numerical slack creation under the high and medium opportunity level
11
. The 
results are aligned with Hypothesis 5 and consistent with Douglas and Wier (2000). Specifically, 
the analysis suggests the positive relation between relativism and the numerical estimates of the 
                                                          
11
 The study suspects that the probable reason of why the same result is not emerge under the low opportunity is due 
to the hypothetical cost forecast is too close to the maximum amount of cost estimation. The available hypothetical 
slack to be created under this setting is approximately $25,000 compared to the medium opportunity $200,000, and 
the high opportunity $375,000. This setting might cause the study to ineffectively analyze the response for the 
budget slack created. 
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budgetary slack. Further, this study does not find any significant interactions among ethical 
positions, horizontal equity, and self efficacy. In addition, the results from the additional analysis 
reveal men are significantly more likely to create budgetary slack than women (p = 0.012).  
Contributions and Implications 
This study contributes to the literature for several reasons. First, the study examines how 
social motives, such as perceived fairness and self efficacy, influence the decision to create 
budgetary slack. The results reveal that the interaction between horizontal equity and self 
efficacy significantly influence the intention to create budgetary slack. Prior research has 
documented an association between budgetary slack and ethical position (Douglas and Wier, 
2000). The second contribution of the current study seeks to add to our knowledge of this 
association by examining ethical position as a moderator given the joint effects of horizontal 
equity and self efficacy. Further, the present study answers calls for research investigating the 
effects of social preferences on individuals’ judgment and decision making (Luft, 1997; Sprinkle, 
2003) and research on participative budgeting settings examining factors related to multiple 
subordinate settings (Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2012). 
The implications of the findings are of interest to practitioners and stakeholders of 
organizations for numerous reasons. First, the results of this study provide information regarding 
the extent to which individuals are willing to sacrifice wealth due to non-pecuniary motives such 
as preferences for horizontal equity. Second, this study examines the unintended consequences of 
prior performance feedback. The results reveal that such feedback can define perceptions of self 
efficacy, which may lead to a higher propensity for unethical behavior.  
Limitations 
 This study is subject to the limitations derived from the consequences of experimental 
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research. Although experimental research controls extraneous factors in its analyses, it is limited 
by the generalizability of the results. The study uses a hypothetical case where the information 
regarding peers’ compensation is available and known for the participants. This setting might not 
be generally applicable in real practice. Furthermore, the results from this study need to be 
carefully interpreted due to the use of graduate students as a sample and to the specific 
characteristics of the task. 
 Another possible limitation is the fact that the experiment did not involved monetary 
compensation for the participants. It is noteworthy that the study found significant interaction 
between horizontal equity and self efficacy on the intention to create budget slack. However, this 
result may possibly differ if the experiment involved economic incentives that relates to the 
participants’ decision to creating budgetary slack.  
Future Research 
 Several avenues for future research are available from this study. This study manipulates 
the horizontal equity through the fairness of the compensation system. An interesting research 
area is to examine whether the influence of horizontal equity to individuals’ decision will be the 
same if the manipulation of the treatment is using the fairness of non-monetary reward such as 
social recognition.  
The current study exclusively examines the unequal horizontal equity in that the 
inequality created disadvantageous situation for the participants when compensation system of 
the peers is better than the individuals. Equity theory (Adams, 1963) proposes the negative state 
from the inequality is also present under the condition where the inequality is advantageous to 
the individual, such as when the individuals have better compensation than their peers. As 
suggested by Matuszewski (2010), future research could further examine whether the 
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advantageous inequality will have the same impact to the decision on budgetary slack creation as 
disadvantageous inequality.  
 Finally, following Whyte et al. (1997), this study manipulates self efficacy through 
hypothetical information regarding participants’ prior performances, rather than directly measure 
participants’ self efficacy level. Bandura (1982) states that ones’ own mastery experience is the 
most effective source of information in developing efficacy perceptions. Therefore, future 
research should consider a laboratory setting that directly measures individuals’ self efficacy 
through task performance.  
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CASE INSTRUMENT 
 
ABC Inc. produces edible crayons especially made for toddlers through two product lines, the 
Red Line and the Green Line. Each product line is led by a production manager. Assume you are 
the production manager for ABC’s Red product line.  
 
One of your tasks is to set the production cost target for each production period. The production 
cost target is reported to the company. Based on the cost target you report, the company transfers 
funds to your product line at the beginning of each period to cover expected costs. In other 
words, the funds you receive each period to run your product line will be equal to the production 
cost target you report.  
 
At the end of the period, the actual production costs can be calculated. Actual costs can range 
from $200,000 to $600,000 and are not related to the costs of other product lines or to other 
periods. The company has hired you with the expectation that you will set the production 
cost target that is equal to your best estimate of the actual cost.  
 
If the production cost target is set too low, the company will transfer insufficient funds to your 
division, and you will not have enough cash available to complete production without delays. 
Delayed production is extremely costly for the company, so they strongly discourage production 
line managers from setting a production cost target that is too low.  
 
If the production cost target is set too high, the company will transfer an unnecessarily large 
amount of funds to your division. This will unnecessarily tie up funds with your division that 
could be used more productively for other business operations. Thus, it is in the company’s best 
interest for you to set your production cost target as accurately as possible. 
 
Your Forecasting System: 
You have a computerized forecasting system in place that uses select data to generate a private 
forecast of the actual costs for the period. As manager, you can use the forecast along with your 
personal experience and expertise to develop your production cost target. 
 
Historically, the raw forecast generated by the system predicts actual production costs with 
75% accuracy. In other words, there is a 75% chance that the actual costs will be equal to the 
forecast, and a 25% chance that the actual costs will be different than the forecast. For example, 
if the forecast is $400,000, then there is 75% chance that the actual costs will be $400,000, and a 
25% chance that the actual costs will be different than $400,000.  
 
The forecast you receive is private information that is not reported to the company. Thus, the 
company will never know what your private forecast predicted. The company only knows that 
the actual production costs will be between $200,000 and $600,000. Therefore, you can decide 
whether to submit a production cost target that is equal to the forecast, or you can use your 
personal skill and expertise to develop a production cost target that is higher or lower than the 
forecast. 
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Your Prior Performance: 
Reporting an accurate cost target is not an easy task for production managers as it requires them 
to have extensive knowledge regarding their production line. In addition, a manager must also 
have the appropriate skills and abilities to effectively incorporate personal knowledge and 
information to determine what cost target is most likely to be accurate.  
 
High self-efficacy treatment:  
Despite the difficulties of reporting accurate cost targets, you have established an excellent 
record for working efficiently and reporting accurate cost targets. Your prior performance in 
setting accurate cost targets is derived from your exceptional ability as a production manager. 
This obviously indicates that you have mastered the skills and the knowledge required to 
effectively and successfully manage your production line. 
  
Low self-efficacy treatment: 
You have not established a record for working efficiently and reporting accurate production cost 
targets. Your poor prior performance in setting accurate cost targets makes it questionable 
whether your skills and knowledge are sufficient to effectively and successfully manage your 
production line.  
 
Compensation system: 
You and the manager of the Green line have the same gender, job description, years of 
experience with the company, and perform the same tasks with the same workload. ABC 
provides a bonus to each of you based on cost savings. Cost savings are defined as the targeted 
production costs less the actual production costs for each production line. Your total 
compensation consists of a fixed salary plus the bonus based on cost savings.   
 
Horizontal equity treatment: 
Your bonus rate is the same as your peer’s bonus rate. Specifically, your bonus rate is 
50%, and the manager of Green Line also has a bonus rate of 50%. Each of you will 
compute your bonus based on the following formula:   
 
Bonus = 50% (production cost target – actual production costs) 
 
The following examples illustrate the computation of your bonuses: 
 
Example 1:  Assume a submitted production cost target of $400,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000 
Your PEER’s Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000 
 
Example 2: Assume a submitted production cost target of $300,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0 
Your PEER’s Bonus = $50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0 
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To make sure you understand, please calculate the bonuses for the third example below before 
continuing (raise your hand if you need assistance with this calculation): 
   
Example 3:  Assume a submitted production cost target of $500,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus =  _________________________________? 
Your PEER’s Bonus =  _________________________________? 
 
Horizontal inequity treatment: 
Your bonus rate is different than your peer’s bonus rate. Specifically, your bonus rate is 
50%, whereas the manager of Green line has a bonus rate of 95%. Each of you will compute 
your bonus based on the following formulas:   
 
YOUR Bonus = Fixed Salary + 50% (production cost target – actual production costs) 
Your PEER’s Bonus = Fixed Salary + 95% (production cost target – actual production costs) 
 
The following examples illustrate the computation of your bonuses: 
 
Example 1:  Assume a submitted production cost target of $400,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000 
Your PEER’s Bonus = 95% ($400,000-$300,000) = $95,000 
 
Example 2: Assume a submitted production cost target of $300,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0 
Your PEER’s Bonus = 95% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0 
 
To make sure you understand, please calculate the bonuses for the third example below before 
continuing (raise your hand if you need assistance with this calculation): 
   
Example 3:  Assume a submitted production cost target of $500,000 and actual costs of 
$300,000. Based on these numbers, 
YOUR Bonus =  _________________________________? 
Your PEER’s Bonus =  _________________________________? 
 
Summary: 
 Your job is to set the production cost target for the period.  
 Actual product costs will be between $200,000 and $600,000.  
 You will receive a private forecast of the estimated actual costs, which is 75% accurate.  
 The company expects you to set your production cost target as accurately as possible. 
Reporting a cost target that is too high or too low will jeopardize company’s best interests.  
 Your bonus is based on the difference between your reported production cost target and actual 
costs. 
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Part I 
 
1. On the scale below please indicate the number that best represents the likelihood that you 
would report a cost target that is different than your private forecast. 
 
Extremely 
likely to report 
a targeted 
production 
cost that is less 
than the 
forecast 
              
    
 
 
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4          5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                  Most likely to  
                                          report a targeted  
                                            production cost  
                                             that is equal to  
                                               the forecast 
 
Extremely  
likely to report a 
targeted 
production cost 
that is higher
than the  
forecast  
 
 
2. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $225,000. Please mark the scale below 
to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You may 
place your mark anywhere on the scale. 
       
  Forecast: 
           
$225          
 
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| 
           $200             $250              $300              $350             $400              $450              $500              $550               $600 
 
 
3. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $400,000.  Please mark the scale 
below to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You 
may place your mark anywhere on the scale. 
 
             Forecast: 
                                                                   
$400          
 
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| 
           $200              $250              $300            $350              $400              $450              $500              $550              $600 
 
 
4. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $575,000. Please mark the scale below 
to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You may 
place your mark anywhere on the scale. 
 
  Forecast: 
                             
$575           
 
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----| 
            $200             $250             $300              $350             $400              $450              $500              $550              $600 
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Part II:  
1. For the case that you just read, your bonus rate was (check one): 
 _____ less than your peer’s bonus rate 
_____  equal to your peer’s bonus rate  
 
2. For the case that you just read, based on the information given about your prior performance, 
which of the following statements is more accurate? (check one) 
_____ my prior performance indicates a lack of ability as production manager 
_____ my prior performance indicates sufficient ability as production manager 
 
3. Historically, how accurate is the private forecast? Please respond with a percentage between 
0% and 100%. 
 
_____ % accurate  
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements: 
 
4. My bonus would increase if my production cost target is higher than actual production costs. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
              
   
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4        5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                     Neutral 
 
Strongly Agree  
 
 
5. It is unethical to intentionally misreport a production cost target. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
              
   
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4        5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                     Neutral 
 
Strongly Agree  
 
 
6. I found the compensation structure among the production managers to be fair. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
              
   
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4        5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                     Neutral 
 
Strongly Agree  
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7. Assume your peer, the production manager of Green line, discloses that he or she always 
overstates his or her cost target. On the scale below please indicate the number that best 
represents the likelihood that you would choose to overstate your cost target. 
 
Extremely  
Unlikely 
              
   
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4        5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                     Neutral 
 
Extremely  
Likely 
 
 
8. Assume your peer, production manager of Green line, discloses that he or she never 
overstates his or her cost target. On the scale below please indicate the number that best 
represents the likelihood that you would choose to overstate your cost target. 
 
Extremely  
Unlikely 
              
   
[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]  
0         1        2          3        4        5          6        7         8         9       10                                    
                                                     Neutral 
 
Extremely  
Likely 
 
 
 
9. Assume that you must choose between two options. If you choose Option A, you will receive 
$5 for certain. If you choose Option B, you will play a lottery where there is a chance you 
will receive $10 and a chance you will receive $0.  
 
For each choice below, indicate whether you would pick Option A or Option B: 
 
   
Which Option would 
you pick? Check one 
box for each Choice. 
 
Option A:  
Certain Payment 
Option B:  
Lottery 
 
Option A Option B 
Choice 1 $5  0% chance of $10; 100% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 2 $5  10% chance of $10; 90% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 3 $5  20% chance of $10; 80% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 4 $5  30% chance of $10; 70% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 5 $5  40% chance of $10; 60% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 6 $5  50% chance of $10; 50% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 7 $5  60% chance of $10; 40% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 8 $5  70% chance of $10; 30% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 9 $5  80% chance of $10; 20% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 10 $5  90% chance of $10; 10% chance of $0  
 
 
Choice 11 $5  100% chance of $10; 0% chance of $0  
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Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following items. Each represents a commonly 
held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your reaction to such 
matters of opinion. Rate your reaction to each statement by checking the box that best reflects 
your opinion. 
             Completely                    Completely 
     Disagree      Neutral           Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
People should make certain that their 
actions never intentionally harm 
another even to a small degree.                   
Risks to another should never be 
tolerated, irrespective of how small the 
risks might be.                   
The existence of potential harm to 
others is always wrong, irrespective of 
the benefits to be gained.                   
One should never psychologically or 
physically harm another person.                   
One should not perform an action 
which might in any way threaten the 
dignity and welfare of another 
individual.                   
 If an action could harm an innocent 
other, then it should not be done.                   
Deciding whether or not to perform an 
act by balancing the positive 
consequences of the act against the 
negative consequences of the act is 
immoral.                   
The dignity and welfare of the people 
should be the most important concern 
in any society.          
It is never necessary to sacrifice the 
welfare of others.          
Moral behaviors are actions that 
closely match ideals of the most 
“perfect” action.          
There are no ethical principles that are 
so important that they should be a part 
of any code of ethics.          
What is ethical varies from one 
situation and society to another.          
Moral standards should be seen as 
being individualistic; what one person 
considers to be moral may be judged to 
be immoral by another person.          
Different types of morality cannot be 
compared as to “rightness.”          
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             Completely                    Completely 
     Disagree      Neutral           Agree  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Questions of what is ethical for 
everyone can never be resolved since 
what is moral or immoral is up to the 
individual.                   
 Moral standards are simply personal 
rules that indicate how a person should 
behave, and are not to be applied in 
making judgments of others.                   
Ethical considerations in interpersonal 
relations are so complex that 
individuals should be allowed to 
formulate their own individual codes.                   
Rigidly codifying an ethical position 
that prevents certain types of actions 
could stand in the way of better human 
relations and adjustment.                   
 No rule concerning lying can be 
formulated; whether a lie is 
permissible or not permissible totally 
depends upon the situation.                   
Whether a lie is judged to be moral or 
immoral depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the action.                   
 
Please answer a few final questions.  
1. What is your current class level?    Masters of Accounting student     MBA student  
   Other (Please specify):________________ 
 
2. What is your overall GPA (at the start of this semester)? _____________ 
3. What is your age? ________________ 
4. What is your gender?       Male         Female   
5. Employment status:   Full-time   Part-time   Not currently employed 
6. How many years of professional employment experience do you have: ____ years  
7. Have you ever been involved in the budgeting process on your job?           Yes  No 
 
Please check that you have answered all the questions. 
Thank you for participating! 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
TABLE 1 
Participants Demographic Information 
  
  
Sample * Full Sample 
  
n = 134 n = 162 
Age 
   
 
Mean 27.6 27.39 
 
Std. Dev 6.16 5.85 
    Gender 
  
 
Female 36.60% 35.40% 
 
Male 63.40% 64.60% 
    Current Class Level 
  
 
MBA 59.40% 60.60% 
 
Master of Accounting 26.30% 24.40% 
 
Other Graduate Programs 14.30% 15.00% 
    GPA 
   
 
Mean 3.36 3.31 
 
Std. Dev 0.91 0.92 
    Employment 
  
 
Full Time 51.10% 50.00% 
 
Part Time 23.30% 21.20% 
 
Not Currently Employed 25.60% 28.80% 
    Years of professional experience 
  
 
Mean 5.22 4.93 
 
Std. Dev 5.91 5.65 
    Have you been involved in the budgeting process in your 
job? 42% 39% 
    Is it unethical to intentionally create budget slack?   
  
 
(1 to 10, where 10 = strongly agree) 
  
 
Mean 7.69 7.55 
  Std. Dev 2.62 2.69 
* Participants who correctly answered the manipulation checks. 
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TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Likelihood to deviate from the 
forecast
a
 
1                         
2. Slack created under High 
Opportunity
b
 
.420
**
 1                       
3. Slack created under Medium 
Opportunity
b
 
.590
**
 .539
**
 1                     
4. Slack created under Low 
Opportunity
b
 
.430
**
 .041 .615
**
 1                   
5. Current class level
c
 .147 -.050 .190
*
 .226
**
 1                 
6. GPA -.035 -.145 .026 .104 .182
*
 1               
7. Age .092 .235
**
 .187
*
 .028 .136 .101 1             
8. Gender
d
 -.217
*
 -.262
**
 -.188
*
 .029 -.130 -.072 -.184
*
 1           
9. Employment
e
 .069 .009 .068 .013 .377
**
 .145 .270
**
 -.196
*
 1         
10.Years of professional experience .129 .208
*
 .231
**
 .069 .158 .053 .916
**
 -.124 .332
**
 1       
11. Have you ever involved in the 
budgeting process?
f
 .185
*
 .149 .228
**
 .115 .182
*
 -.009 .381
**
 -.178
*
 .212
*
 .491
**
 1     
12. Creating a slack is unethical?
g
 .026 -.088 -.069 .049 -.055 .149 .027 .185
*
 -.110 .064 -.016 1   
13. Risk preference
h
  .038 -.015 .042 .057 -.026 .113 .013 -.133 -.013 .013 -.054 .022 1 
a The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to 
report a targeted production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three different hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is $225,000, 
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. Last, when the 
forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. 
c Where 2 = MBA Program, 1 = Master of Accountancy, 0 = Others 
d Where 0 = Male, and 1 = Female 
e Where 2 = Full Time, 1 = Part Time, 0 = Currently Unemployed 
f Where 0 = No, and 1 = Yes 
g Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Strongly Disagree", 5 = " Neutral", and 10 = "Strongly Agree". 
h Level of risk averse. Measured using a series of questions related to investment decisions on low to high risk investment.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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TABLE 3 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviation for the Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast
a
 
  
High Self Efficacy Low Self Efficacy Total 
  
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
   
  
 
  
  Equal Horizontal Equity 6.47 1.48 7.09 1.85 6.79 1.70 
Unequal Horizontal Equity 6.91 2.15 6.56 1.99 6.74 2.06 
Total 6.70 1.86 6.82 1.92 6.76 1.88 
        Panel B: Means and Standard Deviation for Numerical Budgetary Slack 
  
High Self Efficacy Low Self Efficacy Total 
  
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
   
  
 
  
  
Equal 
Horizontal 
Equity 
High Opportunity
b
 89.69 79.02 98.09 92.17 94.02 85.49 
Medium 
Opportunity
c
 57.34 62.41 62.50 55.05 60.00 58.34 
Low Opportunity
d
 -2.19 50.48 0.00 40.36 -1.06 45.20 
 
  
  
 
  
  
Unequal 
Horizontal 
Equity 
High Opportunity
b
 90.74 83.81 91.18 77.09 90.96 79.92 
Medium 
Opportunity
c
 55.00 73.69 55.44 68.80 55.22 70.76 
Low Opportunity
d
 -11.47 85.75 3.68 38.01 -3.90 66.26 
 
  
  
 
  
  
Total 
High Opportunity
b
 90.23 80.90 94.63 84.40 92.46 82.41 
Medium 
Opportunity
c
 56.14 67.94 58.97 61.94 57.57 64.74 
Low Opportunity
d
 -6.97 70.50 1.84 38.95 -2.50 56.68 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was 
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on 
an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less than the 
forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $225,000, 
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. 
c
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $400,000, 
representing the medium opportunity to maximize slack. 
d
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $575,000, 
representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. 
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TABLE 4 
Results of ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation Likelihood
a
 
Panel A : Sample
b
 (n = 134) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.043 0.836 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.032 0.859 
 
Gender 1 7.266 0.008 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 3.154 0.078 
 
Error 129 
  
      Panel B : Slack Creation
c
 (n = 109) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.074 0.786 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.392 0.533 
 
Gender 1 9.335 0.003 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 5.089 0.026 
 
Error 104 
            
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. 
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and 
poor prior performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private 
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary 
slack 
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TABLE 5 
Estimated Marginal Means and Tests of Simple Main Effects for Forecast Deviation 
Likelihood
a
 
Panel A : Estimated Marginal Means (Std. Error) for Sample
b
 (n = 134) 
 
High Efficacy Low Efficacy 
Test of Simple 
Effects 
Equal Horizontal Equity 
6.477 (0.326) 7.103 (0.316) F = 1.898 
n = 32 n = 34 p = 0.085 
Unequal Horizontal Equity 
6.980 ( 0.317) 6.468 (0.318) F = 1.286 
n = 34 n = 34 p = 0.129 
Test of Simple Effects 
F = 1.220 F = 2.000 
 p = 0.135 p = 0.080 
 
    Panel B : Estimated Marginal Means (Std. Error) for Slack Creation
c
 (n = 109) 
 
High Efficacy Low Efficacy 
Test of Simple 
Effects 
Equal Horizontal Equity 
6.663 (0.346) 7.219 (0.340) F = 1.314 
n = 26 n = 27 p = 0.127 
Unequal Horizontal Equity 
7.524 (0.335) 6.542 (0.336) F = 4.223 
n = 28 n = 28 p = 0.021 
Test of Simple Effects 
F = 3.197 F = 1.990 
 p = 0.039 p = 0.081 
 
    
Notes: Each F tests the simple effects of one manipulated variable within the level of the other 
manipulated variable. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among 
the estimated marginal means. The covariate appearing in the model, Gender, is evaluated at 0.37 on 
Panel A and at 0.38 on Panel B. 
Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy 
was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a 
The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. 
Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost 
that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is 
higher than the forecast". 
b
 Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary slack 
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TABLE 6 
Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of Slack Creation
a
 
Panel A : Sample
b
 (n = 134) 
Source   df F  p-value 
          
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.201 0.654 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.143 0.705 
 
Gender 1 5.471 0.021 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.048 0.827 
 
Error 129 
  
     Panel B : Slack Creationc (n = 109) 
Source   df F  p-value 
          
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.007 0.934 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.077 0.782 
 
Gender 1 7.050 0.009 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.502 0.480 
 
Error 104 
            
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal 
and unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good 
prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three 
different hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is 
$225,000, representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the 
forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. 
Last, when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to 
maximize slack. 
b 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive 
budgetary slack 
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TABLE 7 
Means and Correlations of Budgetary Slack Creation by Ethical Position 
Panel A: Budgetary Slack Creation by Idealism 
  
N Mean S.D. t 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
        
Deviation Likelihood
a
 
Low Idealism 68 7.10 1.95 
2.184 0.031 -0.186* High Idealism 64 6.40 1.76 
High Opportunity
b
 
Low Idealism 68 97.03 88.01 
0.659 0.511 -0.057 High Idealism 64 87.62 76.40 
Medium Opportunity
c
 
Low Idealism 68 60.80 68.97 
0.592 0.555 -0.51 High Idealism 64 54.15 60.27 
Low Opportunity
d
 
Low Idealism 68 -4.13 66.08 
-0.342 0.733 -0.03 High Idealism 64 -0.77 45.06 
        Panel B: Budgetary Slack Creation by Relativism 
  
N Mean S.D. t 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
        
Deviation Likelihood
a
 
Low Relativism 68 6.60 1.71 
-0.872 0.385 0.076 High Relativism 64 6.89 2.07 
High Opportunity
b
 
Low Relativism 68 76.25 72.44 
-2.262 0.025 0.195* High Relativism 64 108.13 89.04 
Medium Opportunity
c
 
Low Relativism 68 44.49 69.51 
-2.304 0.023 0.198* High Relativism 64 70.16 57.49 
Low Opportunity
d
 
Low Relativism 68 -2.86 60.22 
0.01 0.992 -0.001 High Relativism 64 -2.97 53.86 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was 
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on an 11 
point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = 
"Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $225,000 , representing the 
high opportunity to maximize slack. 
c
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $400,000, representing the 
medium opportunity to maximize slack.  
d
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the 
low opportunity to maximize slack. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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TABLE 8 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
Step Variable(s) Entered Descriptions 
Step 1 Covariate Gender 
Step 2 Variables of Interest EQ 
  
EFF 
  
ID 
  
REL 
Step 3 Two Way Interactions EQ*ID 
  
EQ*REL 
  
EQ*EFF 
  
EFF*ID 
  
EFF*REL 
  
ED*REL 
Step 4 Three Way Interactions EQ*EFF*ID 
  
EQ*EFF*REL 
  
EQ*ID*REL 
  
EFF*ID*REL 
Step 5 Four Way Interaction EQ*EFF*ID*REL 
      
Variable Definitions:  
EQ = Horizontal Equity, manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and 
unequal. This is a categorical variable where 0 = Unequal, and 1 = Equal. 
EFF = Self Efficacy, manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior 
performance and poor prior performance. This is a categorical variable where 0 = Low 
Efficacy, and 1 = High Efficacy. 
ID = Idealism, measured using Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The idealism 
score is classified as: low or high based on the median split. This is a categorical 
variable where 0 = Low Idealists, and 1 = High Idealists. 
REL = Relativism, measured using Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The 
relativism score is classified as: low or high based on the median split. This is a 
categorical variable where 0 = Low Relativists, and 1 = High Relativists. 
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TABLE 9 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast 
  Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β) 
Step 1 
 Gender -0.22** 
R
2
 0.05** 
Step 2   
EQ 0.043 
EFF -0.049 
ID -0.160* 
REL 0.059 
R
2
 0.08* 
∆ R2 0.030 
Step 3   
EQ*ID 0.081 
EQ*REL -0.057 
EQ*EFF -0.218 
EFF*ID 0.055 
EFF*REL 0.063 
ID*REL -0.054 
R
2
 0.105 
∆ R2 0.025 
Step 4   
EQ*EFF*ID -0.025 
EQ*EFF*REL 0.048 
EQ*ID*REL 0.151 
EFF*ID*REL -0.345 
R
2
 0.127 
∆ R2 0.220 
Step 5   
EQ*EFF*ID*REL 0.184 
R
2
 0.129 
∆ R2 0.020 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self 
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior 
performance.  
** p≤ 0.01 
* p≤ 0.10 
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TABLE 10 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation 
 
High 
Opportunity 
Medium 
Opportunity Low Opportunity 
Step 1       
Gender -0.253*** -0.193** 0.028 
R
2
 0.064*** 0.037** 0.001 
Step 2       
EQ 0.047 0.065 0.030 
EFF 0.001 -0.018 -0.079 
ID 0.017 -0.008 0.010 
REL 0.189** 0.195** 0.007 
R
2
 0.1** 0.078* 0.008 
∆ R2 0.037 0.041 0.008 
Step 3       
EQ*ID 0.140 0.075 0.063 
EQ*REL 0.143 0.000 -0.132 
EQ*EFF -0.068 -0.043 0.108 
EFF*ID -0.073 0.113 0.102 
EFF*REL 0.079 -0.009 -0.092 
ID*REL 0.150 0.081 -0.056 
R
2
 0.127 0.088 0.029 
∆ R2 0.026 0.010 0.020 
Step 4       
EQ*EFF*ID 0.081 0.169 0.192 
EQ*EFF*REL -0.017 0.311 0.101 
EQ*ID*REL 0.390 0.467** 0.293 
EFF*ID*REL -0.013 -0.181 -0.170 
R
2
 0.151 0.137 0.052 
∆ R2 0.024 0.049 0.023 
Step 5       
EQ*EFF*ID*REL -0.168 -0.007 0.206 
R
2
 0.153 0.137 0.055 
∆ R2 0.002 0.000 0.003 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self 
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior 
performance.  
*** p≤ 0.01 
** p≤ 0.05 
* p ≤ 0.10 
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TABLE 11 
Budgetary Slack Creation Gender Effects 
  
N Mean S.D. t p-value 
       
Deviation Likelihood
a
 
Male 85 7.07 1.963 
2.554 0.012 Female 49 6.22 1.624 
High Opportunity
b
 
Male 85 108.76 92.874 
3.113 0.002 Female 49 64.18 49.364 
Medium Opportunity
c
 
Male 85 66.76 65.840 
2.195 0.03 Female 49 41.63 60.142 
Low Opportunity
d
 
Male 85 -3.76 60.178 
-0.339 0.735 Female 49 -0.31 50.564 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self 
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior 
performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private 
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is 
$225,000 , representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. 
c
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is 
$400,000, representing the medium opportunity to maximize slack.  
d
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is 
$575,000, representing the high opportunity to maximize slack.   
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TABLE 12 
Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation 
Likelihood given Peers' Behavior
a
 
Panel A : Sample
b
 (n = 134) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.963 0.328 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.075 0.785 
 
Idealism 1 6.436 0.012 
 
Relativism 1 4.114 0.045 
 
Gender 1 8.079 0.005 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.052 0.821 
 
Idealism*Relativism 1 0.099 0.754 
 
Error 123 
  
      Panel B : Slack Creation
c
 (n = 109) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.460 0.499 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.024 0.878 
 
Idealism 1 5.371 0.023 
 
Relativism 1 4.188 0.043 
 
Gender 1 5.964 0.016 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.050 0.824 
 
Idealism*Relativism 1 0.183 0.670 
 
Error 98 
            
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. 
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and 
poor prior performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private 
forecast given horizontal peers always overstate and or never overstate. Measured on an 11 
point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less 
than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is 
higher than the forecast". 
b 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary 
slack 
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TABLE 13 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Results of ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation Likelihood
a
 
Panel A : Understands the Case 
b
 (n = 112) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.242 0.624 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.337 0.563 
 
Gender 1 4.110 0.045 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 2.497 0.117 
 
Error 107 
  
      Panel B : Slack Creation
c
 (n = 96) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.069 0.793 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.122 0.728 
 
Gender 1 5.456 0.022 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 3.502 0.065 
 
Error 91 
            
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. 
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and 
poor prior performance.  
a
 The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private 
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted 
production cost that is higher than the forecast". 
b 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero 
and or positive budgetary slack 
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TABLE 14 
Sensitivity Analysis Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of Slack 
Creation
a
 
Panel A: Understand the Case
b
 (n = 112) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.123 0.727 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.873 0.352 
 
Gender 1 1.605 0.208 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.089 0.766 
 
Error 107 
  
      Panel B: Slack Creation
c
 (n = 96) 
Source df F  p-value 
      
 
Horizontal Equity 1 0.004 0.949 
 
Self Efficacy 1 0.000 0.994 
 
Gender 1 3.521 0.064 
 
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy 1 0.586 0.446 
 
Error 91 
            
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and 
unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior 
performance and poor prior performance.  
a
 Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three different 
hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is $225,000 , 
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the forecasted cost is 
$575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. Last, when the forecasted 
cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.  
b
 Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check 
c 
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero 
and or positive budgetary slack 
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TABLE 15 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from 
Forecast for Participants who Understand the Case
a
 (n = 112) 
 
Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β) 
Step 1   
Gender -0.186* 
R
2
 0.035* 
Step 2   
EQ 0.054 
EFF -0.063 
ID -0.184* 
REL 0.036 
R
2
 0.073 
∆ R2 0.038 
Step 3   
EQ*ID -0.053 
EQ*REL -0.135 
EQ*EFF -0.218 
EFF*ID 0.107 
EFF*REL 0.139 
ID*REL -0.094 
R
2
 0.108 
∆ R2 0.035 
Step 4   
EQ*EFF*ID -0.025 
EQ*EFF*REL -0.033 
EQ*ID*REL 0.163 
EFF*ID*REL -0.291 
R
2
 0.123 
∆ R2 0.016 
Step 5   
EQ*EFF*ID*REL 0.320 
R
2
 0.130 
∆ R2 0.006 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and 
unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior 
performance and poor prior performance.  
a
 Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check 
* p≤ 0.10 
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TABLE 16 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast 
for Participants who Create Budget Slack
a
 (n = 96) 
 
Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β) 
Step 1   
Gender -0.222** 
R
2
 0.049** 
Step 2   
EQ -0.014 
EFF 0.023 
ID -0.305*** 
REL -0.014 
R
2
 0.141** 
∆ R2 0.091* 
Step 3   
EQ*ID 0.020 
EQ*REL -0.112 
EQ*EFF -0.224 
EFF*ID 0.004 
EFF*REL 0.152 
ID*REL -0.081 
R
2
 0.175 
∆ R2 0.034 
Step 4   
EQ*EFF*ID -0.044 
EQ*EFF*REL -0.030 
EQ*ID*REL 0.080 
EFF*ID*REL -0.345 
R
2
 0.192 
∆ R2 0.017 
Step 5   
EQ*EFF*ID*REL 0.268 
R
2
 0.196 
∆ R2 0.004 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was 
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero and or positive 
budgetary slack 
*** p≤ 0.01 
** p≤ 0.05 
* p≤ 0.10 
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TABLE 17 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation 
for Participants who Understand the Case
a
 (n = 112) 
 
High 
Opportunity 
Medium 
Opportunity Low Opportunity 
Step 1       
Gender -0.190** -0.099 0.061 
R
2
 0.036** 0.010 0.004 
Step 2       
EQ 0.053 0.056 0.011 
EFF -0.009 -0.071 -0.127 
ID 0.001 0.040 0.135 
REL 0.160 0.163 0.032 
R
2
 0.063 0.042 0.040 
∆ R2 0.026 0.032 0.036 
Step 3       
EQ*ID 0.086 -0.061 -0.102 
EQ*REL 0.139 -0.024 -0.253 
EQ*EFF -0.069 -0.096 -0.001 
EFF*ID -0.109 0.093 0.196 
EFF*REL 0.100 0.095 0.073 
ID*REL 0.138 0.064 -0.072 
R
2
 0.088 0.052 0.079 
∆ R2 0.025 0.010 0.039 
Step 4       
EQ*EFF*ID 0.084 0.159 0.045 
EQ*EFF*REL -0.102 3149.000 -0.182 
EQ*ID*REL 0.454* 0.507** 0.190 
EFF*ID*REL -0.027 -0.036 0.083 
R
2
 0.124 0.097 0.092 
∆ R2 0.037 0.045 0.013 
Step 5       
EQ*EFF*ID*REL -0.307 -0.206 0.085 
R
2
 0.130 0.100 0.092 
∆ R2 0.006 0.003 0.000 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. 
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor 
prior performance.  
a
 Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check 
** p≤ 0.05 
* p ≤ 0.10 
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TABLE 18 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation 
for Participants who Create Budget Slack
a
 (n = 96) 
 
High 
Opportunity 
Medium 
Opportunity Low Opportunity 
Step 1       
Gender -0.184* -0.160 -0.026 
R
2
 0.034* 0.026 0.001 
Step 2       
EQ 0.017 0.054 -0.090 
EFF 0.005 0.007 -0.015 
ID 0.031 -0.115 -0.184 
REL 0.172 0.122 0.027 
R
2
 0.063 0.058 0.046 
∆ R2 0.029 0.033 0.045 
Step 3       
EQ*ID 0.156 0.003 -0.311 
EQ*REL 0.152 0.155 -0.014 
EQ*EFF -0.154 -0.053 -0.104 
EFF*ID -0.144 -0.048 0.496*** 
EFF*REL 0.090 0.030 0.154 
ID*REL 0.167 0.193 0.112 
R
2
 0.105 0.084 0.160 
∆ R2 0.043 0.026 0.114 
Step 4       
EQ*EFF*ID 0.175 -0.019 -0.009 
EQ*EFF*REL -0.057 0.099 0.000 
EQ*ID*REL 0.592** 0.531** 0.147 
EFF*ID*REL -0.112 -0.038 0.183 
R
2
 0.167 0.130 0.169 
∆ R2 0.062 0.045 0.009 
Step 5       
EQ*EFF*ID*REL -0.493 -0.335 0.559 
R
2
 0.181 0.136 0.187 
∆ R2 0.014 0.007 0.018 
Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy 
was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.  
a Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero and or positive 
budgetary slack 
* p≤ 0.10 
** p≤ 0.05 
*** p≤ 0.01 
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FIGURE 1  
Forsyth’s ethical ideologies. 
 
Idealism 
                                                       Relativism 
High Low 
High 
Situationist: 
Rejects application of universal moral 
principles. Believes that moral acts 
have positive consequences for all 
persons affected by an action or a 
decision. 
 
Budgetary Slack Prediction: 
Situationists will identify slack creation 
as an unethical act due to the negative 
outcomes of the act. However, as a 
consequence of applying subjective 
moral rules, situationists will decide to 
engage in budgetary slack creation.  
Absolutist: 
Approves actions that result in 
positive consequences for all 
individuals. Also, believes that 
actions should conform to absolute 
moral principles. 
 
Budgetary Slack Prediction: 
Absolutists apply universal moral 
principles in analyzing slack creation 
decisions as morally wrong. They 
will also consider budgetary slack 
creation as unethical since it will 
produce negative outcomes for 
others. Therefore, absolutists are 
expected to create the least amount of 
budgetary slack. 
 
Low 
Subjectivist: 
Rejects moral rules and believes that 
moral decisions are subjective, 
individualistic judgments. Believes that 
negative consequences do not 
necessarily make an action immoral. 
 
 
 
Budgetary Slack Prediction: 
Subjectivists will not consider 
budgetary slack creation to be unethical 
because they will analyze each ethical 
issue subjectively and ignore universal 
moral principles. Therefore, 
subjectivists will create the highest 
amount of budgetary slack. 
 
Exceptionist: 
Accepts moral rules in principle, but 
is willing to violate moral rules in 
order to circumvent negative 
consequences. An action is not 
condemned automatically because the 
action involves negative outcomes for 
others. 
 
Budgetary Slack Prediction: 
Although exceptionists adopt 
universal moral principles, they will 
be willing to apply alternative rules 
and not condemn slack creation as 
immoral due to its potential for 
positive outcomes along with the 
negative outcomes.   
 
Adapted from Forsyth (1980) and Bartnett et al. (1994). 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction of Self efficacy and Horizontal Equity on Likelihood to Deviate 
from Forecast
a
 
Panel A: Sample (n = 134) 
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FIGURE 3 
Interaction of Self efficacy and Horizontal Equity on Slack Creation
a
 
        Panel A: Sample (n = 134) 
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